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ABSTRACT
This thesis will review how public spaces in Kabul, Afghanistan
will be affected by plans for development and formalization under
proposed city plans. The core argument is that these processes
of development under guises of modernity, combined with the
inconsistencies of land rights and a vast informal population
within the city of Kabul are challenging the existence of these
valuable public spaces. The existence of these spaces are of
significant importance as they are places in which residents of
Kabul from a myriad of ethnic backgrounds and income levels
interact, indicating that they have broader social implications
than just physical space.
The vision of Kabul as a failed city is one that perpetuates
its marginalization and the exploitation of the majority of its
informal population. In turn, the lack of publicly available salient
data contributes to the misconceptions of the city. The West
propagates these struggles as it allows itself to define its own
superiority in the subaltern nature of the Other. Kabul Jadid,
the plan for urban development in Kabul commissioned by King
Amanullah Khan in 1923, followed by the Three Master Plans for
Kabul made in the 1960s-1970s are examined in relation to its
trajectory for how modernity was imagined for Kabul.
While this developed the lens under which this paper was
written, several interviews were conducted with a number
of demographically varied Afghans from both in and out of
Afghanistan. From these interviews, the three most frequented
spaces in the city of Kabul emerged: Shahri Now, Mandawi, and
Mikrorayon 3. Current and potentially future urban development
in Kabul threatens these three spaces. The potential eradication
or exclusive nature of these spaces also pose a number of planning
challenges concerning informality and land rights, the concept
of unmapping people, and the involvement of the community in
the process of planning the city. However, there are a number of
physical interventions that can be strategized in order to protect
these spaces.
The questions this thesis will seek to answer are: How are plans
for development and formalization under guises of modernity in
the Third Master Plan challenging the existence of valuable public
spaces in Kabul, Afghanistan? How can what Kabulis identify
as valuable public spaces for gathering be used to strategize
preservation of these space under the Third Master Plan and
future plans?
STAKING SPACE PLANNING, PUBLIC SPACE AND VISIONS OF THE SUBALTERN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
2 CHAPTER TWO: MODERNITY
Kabul as a Failed City
Neoliberalizing Space
The Flexibilization of Land
Population Management
Addressing the Role of Afghans in the West
CHAPTER THREE: KABUL JADID
King Amanullah
Kabul Jadid and Nader Shah.
Lead Up to the Cold War
Soviet Urban Planning
First Master Plan of Kabul
Second Master Plan of Kabul
Third Master Plan of Kabul
12 4 CHAPTER FOUR: REEMERGENCE OF
THE MASTER PLAN
4.1 Municipality and Ministry Tension
4.2 Attempts at Formal Urbanization
5 CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY
14
16
19
23
27
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
28
32
37
38
40
42
44
Summary of Data Collection Methods
Extended Methodology
First Round Data Collection
Second Round Data Collection
100 Afghans
Method Analysis
6 CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
Shahri Now
Mandawi
Mikrorayon 3
48
6.1
6.2
6.3
50
53
56
57
58
59
62
64
66
69
75
79
Table of Contents
7 CHAPTER SEVEN: PLANNING IMPLICATIONS
7.1 Informality and Land Rights 84
7.2 Lack of Data and Information 88
7.3 Further Development Issues 91
7.4 Implications for Involvement 92
7.5 Specific Recommendations 93
8 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 98
BIBLIOGRAPHY 102
APPENDICES 106
STAKING SPACE PLANNING, PUBLIC SPACE AND VISIONS OF THE SUBALTERN
CHAPTER ONE
INT ROD ) T UC iN
Ananya Roy's City Requiem starts out in the midst of a yearly book fair located in the
heart of urban Calcutta. The normalcy of the book fair would almost convince any
outside observer that all is right in Calcutta; surely the cosmopolitanism of having a
production of books from all over the world and having individual stalls dedicated to
different nations would indicate Calcutta as a center of a world exhibition. Instead there
is great irony at this attempt at cosmopolitanism, at this showing of Calcutta as a "city
of spectacle" (Harvey, 1987) because, soon, a fire ensues which forces an abrupt end to
the fair. The irony lies in the metaphor between the book fair and Calcutta as a whole,
which Roy compares to the crumbling infrastructure of Calcutta. This idea of a crumbling
infrastructure becomes apparent when the lack of running water, heat, and electricity
almost convinces one to believe that the government, let alone public works, does not
exist. So this exhibition at a book fair becomes just that, an exhibition, a spectacle-for
the heart of these big cities that claim being cosmopolitan and progressive lies in the
flames that drive the "French publishers who arrived in the city ever so tentatively" (Roy,
2003) away. The spectacle that displays the city's ineptitude of putting out a simple fire.
A similar spectacle of the city has been made of Kabul, Afghanistan, yet in a manner
slightly distinct than what Roy posits Calcutta to have become. The spectacle that is
the city of Kabul is not one that attempts to conceal its crumbling infrastructure, but
one that embraces and embellishes its Other status as the West perpetuates visions of
12
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Afghanistan being a subaltern' space.
The spectacle therefore is both within
and without Afghanistan. Those who
are within and maintain localized
power embrace visions of modernity
and the market-led postwar recovery
that this modernity habitually entails.
These visions of modernity are what
Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong label as
the "inter-referencing" (Ong & Roy,
2011) of Asian models of modernity.
Because these models are more near
and familiar, they are ultimately more
accessible. Those who are outside
are enchanted by what they do not
understand and are fully engrained
in a politics of location. They brand
and romanticize the experience of
those in the country, subconsciously
asserting their modernity through
their expressions of anxiety about
Afghans that are perpetuated
through imperialistic dialogue.
The West therefore defines their
modernity against the backward
tradition of the Afghans, unaware
and perhaps ignorant to the fact that
23 years of war has not destroyed
Afghanistan. Rather, the local
regime of institutionalized practices
and their embedded assumptions
have persisted as four national
leaderships have been overthrown.
In reality, the current trend in Kabul
exemplifies what many planners such
as Jane Jacobs have aspired to as the
urban ideal of a vibrant walkable
city of mixed-use low-rise density;
sustainable patterns of urban
development that ultimately help
the country simply because Kabulis
cannot afford to consume resources
in the way Westerners do (Calogero,
2011).
While this dialogue and rhetoric
have served to further marginalize
populations, I have elected to examine
Afghanistan as it has persisted in its
own attempts at modernity dating
from the 1920s. I examine how
this dialogue and constant struggle
has shaped development and how
it may affect public spaces that are
commonly frequented in Kabul. The
aim of this thesis is, upon finding
the frequented public spaces in
Kabul through extensive interviews
and mapping exercise, to discover
both the planning implications
and potential strategies that can
be employed in light of plans for
the city. It is hoped that in light
of development and attempts at
modernization, that these spaces
can remain intact, inclusive, with the
character that has drawn people to it
in the first place.
I question the role of planners in
dealing with societal and cultural
dynamics in preserving these spaces,
while making the government
accountable to its citizens. Ultimately,
I hope to bring the Afghan voice and
narrative to the planning dialogue.
13
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CHAPTER TWO
MODE RNTY
2.1 KABUL AS A FAILED CITY
The image of Kabul as a failed city, barren and oppressive has constantly persisted through
Western media and dialogue. Mike Davis in the Planet of Slums posits that societies and
nations allow such peripheries to exist and to be in a constant state of desperation so that
they can be exploited. The sole type of integration that is desired and allowed is the type that
allows those marginalized into the informal economy, where informal labor can be exploited
with no consequences by state actors, if such state actors do in fact exist. In doing so, states
can justify the marginality of those on the peripheries of societies, while perpetuating an
Other status. Therefore, states will not feel accountable to, or burdened by, this Other
population, or any sort of responsibility towards them. (Davis, 2006)
14
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2.2 NEOLIBERALIZING SPACE
The repercussions of such policies
and visions are magnified throughout
the entirety of both the city of Kabul
and Afghanistan on a much broader
scale. The lack of salient data and
information on comprehensive
demographic data displays a
disregard for accountability. Coalition
forces and the International Security
Assistance Force' , what Pietro
Calogero identifies as part of the
Urban Regime2 in Kabul, maintain a
direct role in shaping the urban space
and what it means to interact in this
space. Ultimately this control directs
how this space is governed. Yet,
regardless of the influx of resources
into both the city and country,
information has become a capital
asset in that planning and access to
1The Nato-Led Security Mission in
Afghanistan established by the United
Nations
2 Calogero defines an urban regime as
not necessarily the presence of an elite
governing structure, but instead the
various elites that are involved in "social
production," a term derived from Clarence
Stone.
Image 2.1: The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing survey team engineers deciding the routes and
locations to be surveyed (Calogero, 2003)
information are privatized. Seemingly
as a direct result of this privatization,
the urban elite does not need or
want to know how many people live
in Kabul and under what conditions.
This lack of comprehensive
demographic data assumes that the
neighborhood cannot be evaluated
and changes to the rapidly evolving
situations in relation to Kabul
cannot be evaluated. The people
are thus unmapped (Roy, 2003)
from existence. In Roy's Requiem
the State is able to maintain the
informality marginalized populations
experience in Calcutta experience
16
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by keeping things uncertain in their
daily lives through the absence of
maps. What data is collected is
privatized. When an official survey of
population, migration, and income
was made by the Ministry of Urban
Development and Housing planners,
the information was retained by
the Planning and Development
Collaborative International (PADCO).
PADCO wanted to sell its planning
services and knowledge of Kabul to
the multilateral agencies that inhabit
Afghanistan (Calogero, 2011). Kabul
was being sold information about
itself to itself.
This level of governing parallels the
complex relationship between what
Foucault identifies as the concept
of government and governing. The
relationship of one self to itself
in that individuals are expected
to govern their own behavior and
choices, while also expecting that
they will be governed. The individual
is both an agent of action and an
object of domination (Foucault,
The Subject and the Power, 1983).
The privatization of services, of
information, displays how as a whole
the city of Kabul is both the agent of
action in that it is enabled to conduct
surveys and gather information as it
pleases, yet it is also the object of
domination in that it surrenders that
very same information and is unable
to access it. PADCO had led a survey
team in Kabul in 2003 developing a
list of 35 questions about population,
recent migration, income and living
costs, and urban services which were
then turned over to Afghanistan's
Ministry of Urban Development and
Housing. Ultimately, however, PADCO
was unwilling to share detailed
information on its initial analysis of
housing and urban conditions as they
wanted to maintain it as negotiating
leverage, even though much of the
raw data was gathered by volunteers
outside of PADCO through a direct
request from Engineer Pashtun,
the Minister of Housing and Urban
Development (Calogero, 2011).
Perhaps even more remarkable was
the general disinterest in the social-
demographic survey. Calogero, a
volunteer who was directed under
Engineer Pashtun to partake in data
collection under contract with PADCO,
indicates that PADCO withheld the
data in hopes of a contract to write a
general plan for Kabul, but never did
receive such a contract and thus all
survey-analysis work was lost. How
then is a quantitative analysis to be
conducted, and a grounded set of
planning recommendations to be
proposed, upon data that does not
exist?
Foucault identifies and describes
power relations through a series of
struggles that emerge as a resistance
to these different forms of power.
These struggles are often linked to
what he identifies as knowledge,
competence, and qualification,
ultimately struggles against the
"privileges of knowledge" (Foucault,
The Subject and Power, 1982). This
struggle against the power over
knowledge is in direct opposition
to secrecy and deformation. It
is a question of how knowledge
functions and circulates, not a
complete refusal of this knowledge.
It is about the regime du savoir
(Foucault, The Subject and Power,
1982). The privatization of Kabuli
demographic and survey information
is a means of continued mystification
17
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of the representations imposed on
the people of Afghanistan, and this
mystification is a result of murky
identities. Foucault underscores
the growing importance of the
struggle against forms of subjection,
one that places individuals into
various categories and permanently
attaches him to his own identity,
forcing upon him a law of truth that
the individual must observe and
carry out in his daily activities. Not
only is it a "law of truth" that the
subject must recognize of himself,
but it is one where everyone else
recognizes in him as well. In short,
individuals become tied to what
they produce, what they do, or what
others identify them as producing
and doing. Therefore though Afghan
citizens, and Kabulis in particular,
are in a constant struggle against
the various forms of domination and
exploitation that seem to plague the
country. Their struggle against the
forms of subjection is emerging as
an increasingly paramount concern.
It is through the impositions of
mystifications and the withholding
of salient information regarding
the people of Afghanistan that
Afghans are constantly being
forced to embody the Other. When
information about them is not made
apparent, misconceptions persist as
the West defines their modernity
in the face of all that is "backward"
about Afghanistan. (Foucault, The
Subject and Power, 1982)
18
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2.3 THE FLEXIBILIZATION OF LAND
Image 2.2: In the city of Kabul, the difference between destruction caused by war and lucrative development is
stark (Moore)
The nonexistence of land titling is
maintained by the lack of maps;
therefore, multiple territorial claims
are made at any given time because
no formal proof exists of the land
belonging to one political party or
another. This is what Roy identifies
as the "flexibilization of land" (Roy,
2003). In Kabul, the urban elite
similarly maintains land in a persistent
state of limbo but does so until a
remunerative development project
is proposed and carried through.
The flexibilization of land promotes
a high level of tenure insecurity;
informal planning persists as urban
development is governed through the
withholding of explicit commitments
from the Kabul Municipality, who
house the Plan Implementation
Office. The very establishment and
implementation of a solid urban
plan, in whatever form this may
materialize to be, means that those
with the power of enforcement has
committed to protect this area as
secure. The flexibilization of land
releases those with the power of
enforcement from the responsibility
of maintaining this land as secure.
The lack of formalization of this land,
and almost the complete disregard of
it while Afghans are in the process of
planning, neither provides a secured
terrain, but absolves the government
from having to address the issue.
They are not written into plans so that
when a development project reveals
itself, the land can be used, written
19
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into the plan, and ultimately reinforce
Kabul's modernity. The regime is
denying recognition to development
they know is occurring. According to
Calogero, if this urban regime fails to
provide the security that is required
for the secured terrain written into
the plan because of urbanization
pressures, the regime itself becomes
an informal entity. Therefore it is in
the best interest of the regime to
not write anything about land too
explicitly into the plan, and instead
see what development project may
image z.s: AT,
(Nickelsberg)
arise. They could then include that
into the plan, garner a profit from
it, meanwhile protecting the land
while achieving goals of modernity.
This of lends itself to bribes and
political vote buying with promises
to turn in these favors in the future.
However, this does not just occur
in Kabul; these types of practices,
similar to land banking, occur in the
most supposedly urbanely advanced
cities in the West. Where then is the
negotiation that occurs? How does
the Ministry and City government
deal with unplanned urban
development as a process of gaining
political favors when they are not the
ones working on this development
? What happens when this type of
development is being done by the
Ministry of Defense, who is giving
out land in favor of political favors
(Calogero, 2011)? The majority of
those receiving these political favors
do not see anything fundamentally
wrong with being given, or handing
out, this land. This highlights the fact
that, what Calogero refers to as the
urban regime, is not necessarily the
formal planners; rather the urban
regime are those who influence the
20
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shape of the city, who are involved
with strategies with what to do with
formality, regardless of the fact that
they are highly involved in informal
development themselves. The urban
regime in this case is both the Ministry
of Defense who is giving out the land
and ultimately the city, who does not
know how to deal with the situation
because they have disagreements
among themselves about policies
regarding squatters.
It is interesting, however, to consider
what risks the formalization of land
may bring should the poor obtain this
apparently desired formalization. So
if we do consider the formalization
of housing and land titling as the
commodification of urban space
as Hernando de Soto implicitly
argues for (de Soto, 1989), and as
is typically argued when resources
are treated as investment collateral
once formalized, then we must look
at what this does to the overall
indebtedness of the poor. This
should be examined not only in terms
of tenure security, but also in terms
of the relationship of dependence
that is then perpetuated. The poor
become indebted to anyone who can
afford to lend and invest, and in the
urban environment, these people
are the social elite who have strong
relationships with the political elite.
In turn, these lenders influence how
local interest rates are figured. The
social elite is in control of the poor
who have been given the opportunity
to indebt themselves through this
tenure security. However, if they
owe a mortgage and default on
their payment because of low wage
earnings, they lose their homes,
which they were previously able to
occupy without ownership (Polanyi,
1944). We may be concerned with the
lack of tenure security for informal
housing, but gentrification and a
culture of dependence is perpetuated
and clears homes legally (Calogero,
2011). In Kabul, the demolition of
informal housing has strong popular
support, even though it is restricted
to road-widening projects that are
consistent with the 1978 Master Plan.
The rights of these tenants are then
extremely unsubstantial, weak, and
negotiable, completely dependent
on acts of recognition.
This then becomes an interesting
dynamic between what is considered
a right and what is codified into law.
One would expect laws to protect
basic rights. Informal settlements
in this regard can be considered a
claim on urban space, an assertion
of the "right to the city" (Lefebvre,
1968). This is in essence, citizenship
in its purest form-citizens claiming
their land through their urban
informality because they are not
being recognized any other way.
It has, in fact, been only a recent
phenomenon to reformulate rights
into actual law. Ideas and theories of
John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau
and Thomas Paine have been often
credited for this. Even though, in
1789 the Constitutional Congress
agreed to pass a Bill of Rights to
be put into the Constitution. This
was more of a strategic move-an
amendment that had to be passed
in order to get states to accept and
ratify the other seven articles of the
Constitution. (Calogero, 2011)
At the same time, these codified
rules are static-protected and
enforced by the privileged urban
21
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elite of every society, unmoving to
the growing changes and often times,
to the growing disparities between
the privileged and unprivileged.
Eventually, rights that are meant
to be innate are not protected by
a set of codified rules that were
put in place a long time ago. The
needs of the underprivileged change
throughout time and under different
circumstances, and these static rights
do not change along with them.
In situations in the West, urban
informality and the rights denied
to the underprivileged are out of
sight, as segregation make the poor
seemingly invisible to the rich, and
as racist dialogue and xenophobia
socially push the illegal down to a less-
than-human level, one not deserving
of rights (Calogero, 2011). But this
distance, both physically and through
dialogue does not exist in Kabul;
spatial segregation between Afghan
residents is seemingly nonexistent,
as informal settlements climb up the
mountain and seemingly loom over
the entire city. Similarly, families are
made up of both formal and informal
members, and informal homes are
usually attached to formal ones
with cousins and relatives occupying
the informal places, and ultimately
treated as servants. Dialogue cannot
distance formal and informal citizens
from each other, nor can those who
are considered formal see those who
are informal as "less than human."
This is due to the fact that most
informality in Kabul, as is the situation
in many developing countries, cuts
across ethnic groups and virtually
all social variables except for class.
As Calogero asserts, vulnerability
to eviction even, does not correlate
with the degree of legality of the
development, but how connected
the owners are through their social
connections with the urban regime.
Therefore those who are wealthier
and have these connections are still
considered squatters because the
land was informally given to them;
they can in essence, claim the land in
the same way the older and poorer
squatters can and do.
22
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2.4 POPULATION MANAGEMENT
The West and the Rest
When a power looks after their
population's well being in Western
cities, it is termed planning. When
this same power goes beyond their
own jurisdiction in caring for other
populations, this care is termed
development. This is a western
tradition, to transcend borders
and boundaries in the name of
development. This is not to say
that the presence and levels of
sovereignty is completely determined
by the West and transnational actors
within developing countries and
more specifically, the city of Kabul.
Rather, this sovereignty is constantly
compromised, negotiated, molded,
and divided between local, national,
and transnational actors. This
divvying up of sovereignty between
these various actors seems to be
the most effective and efficient way
of domination. Though the West,
namely the United States, is the
most dominant political and military
force in Kabul, they avoid answering
to many international objections
and criticisms by not exercising full
sovereignty and outright colonization.
This also relieves them of having to
deal with a slew of responsibilities
that have no direct and immediate
bearing to their interests. There are
responsibilities and justifications for
political leaders to rule over their
own population, but these political
leaders do not have to answer to
many cross border populations.
(Calogero, 2011)
The term West is utilized throughout
this paper to refer to those from
developed countries in North America
and Europe who have various forces,
whether they be diplomatic or
military forces, NGOs, or contractors
in Afghanistan. Calogero identifies
elite Afghans asagrounded projection
of the West in their ability to access
capital from outside of Afghanistan
and their ability to leave the country
at whatever point they want to. How
the West views Afghan citizens who
are not the Afghan elite have played
a major role in the way resources are
distributed throughout Kabul and
the way elite spaces are secured in
Kabul. The security measures put in
place in an effort to protect the risks
to the elite in Kabul, both foreign and
international, shape the character
of the public spaces and entire
neighborhoods in Kabul. The ISAF
front in Kabul has changed the city
into a haven for local elite Afghans,
but other military forces, such as
the United States' Coalition Forces
in their attempts to protect Western
security, have actually deflected all
the risk onto other populations in
favor of the protection of a single
population in Kabul. What then to
say about those Afghans who lay
outside of this ability to be protected
by these various forces existing
throughout the city and shaping
the city's character, neighborhoods
and public spaces? They fall
outside of the scope because their
romanticization has resisted even the
simple discussion of protecting these
citizens in the same way Western
forces or Afghan elites are protected.
Thus, the actual protection and
security of these various bodies, is
an intentional form of planning as
it allocates scarce urban resources
in a manner that significantly alters
23
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the spatial characteristics of the city.
(Calogero, 2011)
This is telling when issues of public
space come into play and how
common Afghan citizens utilize
this space and interact with it in
comparison to the Western presence
and Afghan elite. Such as the case of
the security post at the entry of an
Afghan ministry in Image 2.4.
Barbed wire lines the entrance and
protrudes into public and sidewalk
spaces, driving virtually everyone
on the outside of this Ministry onto
the street with traffic, among the
traffic. Residents with cars are
typically upper class, and like the
Ministry, resent the pedestrians
and vendors in their space. This is
what Calogero refers to as outsiders
deferring risk from themselves onto
Kabulis who are merely trying to
move about, trade, and make a living
in what is considered to be public
space. This is gentrification, but
because Kabul is already space where
"segregation-by-distance" (Calogero,
2011) is not entirely possible, the
type of exclusion that occurs is an
Image 2.4: Checkpoints for a Ministry in Kabul (Calogero, 2007)
architecture of exclusion on the actual
sidewalk. These Afghan citizens are
enjoying fewer citizen rights than
the foreigners who are actually living
in their city. The physical sidewalk
is being given to these foreigners
without their permission.
As is the case in a particular instance
for a store owner who is seeing their
shop and home being repurposed
and taken by the Municipality in
order to make space for the urban
elite who are moving about the space
in their cars:
This store has been in my
family for generations, it is
attached to my home on the
second level, and they want
to give me money and cut
half my property off and then
build a road through it. How
could they do this to us? Who
made it okay to do this? Just
because they decided to build
a road?
Outsiders in Afghanistan, regardless
of their reasons for being there, are
actively involved in an urban self-
segregation. They are protected
in a way that infringes upon the
public space of Afghan residents
and evolves into self-isolation. The
irony lies in how foreign agencies can
conduct and engage communities
and make policies influencing their
lives when there is both a physical
and metaphorical boundary between
them. The urbanism in Kabul is a
"splintered urbanism" such that
immediate neighbors seem to inhabit
completely different worlds (Graham
& Marvin, 2001).
This spatial segregation has further
debilitating effects on the discourse
surrounding Afghanistan in the West
as it perpetuates an ignorance of
24
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the actual conditions in Kabul. As
barricades are drawn up and foreign
workers and the elite physically
separate themselves from the site,
they have an experience of supposed
lowered risk. This experience is far
removed from a direct experience
of the actual sites they occupy
throughout the city, limiting
how these foreigners experience
Afghanistan. In this regard, not
knowing what Kabul and Afghanistan
are actually like, this ignorance
circulates fear of the area. This fear
further encourages higher security
measures that in turn prevents these
people from directly experience the
site. Spatial segregation contributes
to the irrelevance of many cultural
sensitivities that are required in order
to properly assimilate into the Afghan
culture and way of thinking in order
to best understand the people and
"help" them. Language-acquisition is
not necessarily encouraged as it does
not help in the advancement of one's
career in many of these NGOs and
international institutions. Foreign
workers have 12-14 hour days, so
actual learning must occur during
their own spare time.
The specialization in best practices
that can be transferred from one
geographical region to the next has
taken over much of the aid industry
in a manner that requires those with
these skills to interact with other
institutions and transnational aid
agencies themselves. It simply is
not always necessary to know much
about the culture and the language,
if you barricade yourself from the
public and interact with those who
speak your professional jargon.
Many understandings of Afghan
culture are thus not transferred
to Westerners and the urban elite
whose decisions greatly affect the
outcome of the urban space of Kabul.
Take for example U.S. Ambassador
to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry who
said on August 17, 2009 that "in
2001, there were no institutions
in Afghanistan," (Calogero, 2011)
when in reality, many institutions
were present. Even the ones that
the United States did not want to
be around were present, such as the
Third Master Plan of 1978, a Soviet-
assisted plan that continues even
today to govern much of the formal
urban development in Kabul. Given
Eikenberry's extensive experience
in Kabul, what can be said about
the degree of separation between
Westerners and Afghans and their
exposure to each other? What
type of intelligence gathering is
actually occurring if intentions of
overcoming cultural barriers and
promoting understanding are not
being transferred over the various
channels of flowing information?
Accountability and corruption
discussions, debates, and research
revolve around deliverables for
various projects. The neoliberal ideal
of sending out aid as soon as possible
and as less expensive as possible
does not consider the accountability
to the people who are being directly
impacted by these aid projects. The
irony lying in that these agencies are
extremely responsive to local needs,
but not at all accountable to the local
people which is all that agency-donor
relationships seem to be. Fostering
a desired culture of dependence
in the midst of a complete lack of
accountability. The politics of urban
development in Kabul are linked to
the politics of Washington D.C., and
the West in its entirety.
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2.5 ADDRESSING THE ROLE OF AFGHANS IN THE WEST
Discussions between the West and
those that currently live in Kabul or in
Afghanistan as a whole, surfaces an
important dynamic between these
groups of people and those Afghans
who have grown up in the West, but
still consider themselves to be highly
involved in the future of Afghanistan.
When Afghans discuss the "we" in
future plans for the city, does this
"we" include the Afghan-Americans
or expatriates who may desire to
return to the country at some point
in the future. Does this we exclude
this diaspora, and if so, does that
mean the diaspora is not allowed to
plan the city?
This does not seem to be the case,
as many western Afghans are
actively pursuing current planning
efforts. Take for example Calogero's
encounter with the Afghan-American
from Virginia. This individual was
working with the Ministry of the
Interior, translating the Fairfax
Planning Code into Farsi in hopes of
implementing it in Kabul. Theironylies
in that Fairfax was designed for low-
density suburban development, with
segregated urban uses, when Kabul
is extremely dense with commercial
uses that are very well integrated
throughout residential areas. Despite
Calogero's encouragement of many
of the current practices of design
in Kabul as supporting sustainable
low-rise mixed-use development,
this Afghan-American accused
him of promoting the Otherness
of Kabul and not wanting the city
and country to modernize. What
then, is the distinction between
someone who comes from within
a community versus an outsider in
urban planning? How is the Virginian
an insider if he was educated and had
a large majority of his experiences
outside of Afghanistan? Is it just
that he considers himself Afghan, is
he not an Other? These identities,
particularly of Afghan-Americans, are
under constant negotiation. This is
identity politics, at its worst, where
groups are defining itself by what it
is not; not an outsider, not an Other
(Said, 1978). Some have contrasted
this view of identity politics in
indicating that individuals do not
depend on merely just differences to
constitute their respective identities.
Rather, the formation of identities
is more aggressive and antagonistic
in understanding the differences
that exist between various groups
(Mouffe, 2005). Whether this
identity definition in Afghans is
an "antagonistic understanding of
difference," or merely the politics of
identity that are formed by a simple
realization of difference to both
foreigners and everyone else, it is
instrumental when considering public
participation in the decision making
process, as well as the term "public"
when designing and integrating
various spaces throughout the city.
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CHAPTER THREE
KABUL JADID
3.1 KING AMANULLAH
The common misconception of Afghanistan as a space that has halted development
or any type of progression throughout years of internal and external conflict can easily
be rebuked with former King Amanullah's visions for a modern Kabul, a Kabul Jadid1.
Kabul has been portrayed, imagined, and reimagined through a changing lens that
has been shaped by the politics of the time. This provides a number of contradictions
between Kabul as it is experienced and observed, and Kabul as it is depicted. On
the one hand people are fed images of Afghanistan laden with war, blood, victims,
mud huts, bomb shelters, and land mines. On the other hand, the city is laden with
traces of development, modernization, and plans. Though the former most certainly
exists, they also serve to perpetuate an image of Afghanistan as backward, perhaps
contributing to the Western belief that their presence in these subaltern spaces are
necessary to save the savages.
'Kabul Jadid is translated from Farsi as Modern Kabul. It was King Amanullah's modernization plan for
Kabul
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Amanullah commissioned Kabul
Jadid in 1923 as an attempt to
modernize Kabul, and wished to
emulate the Turkish. He was an
admirer of the Turkish in their
ability to both preserve local history
and culture and use contemporary
models of urbanization throughout
their city. Amanullah's efforts at
modernization, however, were not
merely limited to the layout and
design of the city. Rather, he wished
to modernize the entire experience of
Kabul; embodying modernization not
only in their physical surroundings
through an experience of Beaux-Arts
style urban design, electrification,
and a railroad, but also through their
clothing, requiring Kabulis to dress in
European-style clothing while in the
public spaces of the capital (Wild,
1982).
Antoine de Saint-Exupery mocks the
belief among many Europeans that
knowledge can only be produced by
those who were dressed in properly
European clothing, as he indicates in
Le Petit Prince:
/ have serious reason to believe
that the planet from which the
little prince came is the asteroid
known as B612. This asteroid has
only been seen one time through
the telescope, in 1909, by a
Turkish astronomer
He thence made a grand
presentation of his discovery to
the International Astronomical
Congress. But no one believed
him because of his clothing.
Grown-ups are like that.
Fortunately, for the reputation
of Asteroid B612, a Turkish
dictator insisted that his people,
under pain of death, dress
themselves in European clothing.
In 1920 the astronomer gave his
demonstration all over again,
dressed in a very elegant suit.
And this time everybody accepted
his report. (Saint-Exupery, 1943)
This attempt to design a modern
Kabul was a not so subtle attempt
to modernize the entire society
through a spatial-aesthetic lived
experience. The irony in the Saint
+j0
1/
Image 3.1: Turkish Astronomer in The Little Prince
(Saint-Exupery, 1943)
Exupery's passage lies in the fact that
the astronomer has the competence
to make an observation that the
Europeans could not, and the
Europeans refused to accept modern
technical competence from someone
who did not appear themselves to be
modern. Modernization itself looks
down upon all previous attempts
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at modernity, and the West seems
to highly ignore all these previous
attempts at modernization that
Afghans have had in their city projects
since the 1920s. (Calogero, 2011)
Amanullah's regime collapsed in
1929, but Kabul Jadid has persisted
to today. The monarchy that ruled
Afghanistan following Amanullah
continued to developed new districts,
yet they were still aligned with Kabul
Jadid. In fact, the original land-use
allocations that were commissioned
during the time of Amanullah are still
used to this day.
Darulaman was to be at the very
center of this new Kabul, and the
area around Darulaman were to be
saved for administrative purposes
(Wild, 1982). While the West
sees Darulaman as the complete
destruction of the country, a visual
for the ruined state of Afghanistan,
Afghans do not harbor similar
feelings of nostalgia or attachment
to the building. In fact, Darulaman
itself is rarely frequented (Calogero,
2011). The area surrounding
Darulaman, however is continually
being developed as an administrative
area as the 1923 Kabul Jadid was laid
out under Amanullah. Currently,
the United Nations, ISAF, and the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development all have facilities
around the palace. This presents
two images of Afghanistan: one,
that Afghanistan is still chaotic and
anti-modern and developing under
a plan that was formulated and
implemented in 1923; two, that
Afghans in fact are following urban
development in an organized fashion,
and in places where development
is formal through the city, they are
following land-use allocations and
rules laid out (Calogero, 2011). The
Image 3.2: Map of the City of Kabul, Darulaman extracted (Afghanistan Information Management Services,
Nawabadl0whaan
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2005)
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rhetoric surrounding the choice
between the two are part of a similar
trajectory of Afghanistan being a
subaltern space.
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3.2 KABUL JADID AND NADER SHAH
Amanullah's father-in-law, Mahmud
Tarzi grew up in exile in Damascus
under Ottoman rule. This connected
Amanullah to become a meticulous
follower of recent Turkish history.
Along with his wife Soraya,
Amanullah and Tarzi concentrated
on modernization as the major
component of his time in power
(Wild, 1982). Amanullah wanted
Kabul to follow the Beaux-Arts style of
urban design that was made popular
by Daniel Burnham in the Chicago's
World Fair in 1893 so he hired a
German architect, Albert Harten, to
lay out Kabul in the same manner.
Harten's employment formalized
the direction that Kabul was
headed in the world modernization
conversation. Here Darulaman was
heavily modeled after and referred to
the Reichstag in Berlin. (Wild, 1982)
Darulaman was thus designed to be
a visual and physical center point
for all of the administrative offices,
and ultimately the center of this
new modern city, this kabuijadid. A
number of radial avenues physically
Image 3.3: Reichstag, Germany
(Unknown)
Image 3.4: Darulaman Castle, Kabul
(Wenger, 2006)
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and visually connected Darulaman
with its surrounding neighborhoods,
making it the center of all these
neighborhoods and holding its
administrative importance. (Wild,
1982)
Amanullah's attempt at
modernization was seen merely as
symbolic to Afghans, as Darulaman
was being built and the areas
around developed, Afghans did
not see a parallel increase in their
standard of living for the majority
of the population. Thus, when
Amanullah returned from his seven
month tour of Europe in 1928 and
was forced to renounce his throne,
Nader Shah Musahiban, Amanullah's
former Army Chief, was named
king. While Amanullah was seen as
having been involved in symbolic
acts of modernization, Nader Shah
established a number of institutional
changes that were identified as actual
modernization, such as opening up
many schools. (Gregorian, 1969)
Nader Shah's work heavily impacted
patterns of urbanization in Kabul.
The federal government was able to
control the development of land in
Kabul specifically because he turned
over the royal property to the public
treasury, so that the Ministry of
Finance could administer it (Shah,
1939). Nader Shah then decided to
expand northwest instead of the
initial plans of expanding southwest.
The base at Bibi Mahru hill that later
became an actual district by the
name of Shahri Now (meaning New
"
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Image 3.5: Gardens in Kabul, 1842 (Calogero)
City). Nader Shah began urbanizing
the surrounding areas of what is
today Shahri Now with a particular
concentration on the urbanization
of the gardens of the area (Calogero,
2011). The neighborhood that had
its primary function replaced by
Shahri Now became known as Shahri
Kona, the Old City. Old in this tense
means used and second-hand, and
less romanticized as ancient and
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deserving to be preserved. The
language of modernization has been
imposed upon Kabul, identifying
everything that has been developed
as kona, ancient, and backwards,
and everything else as new. This
distinction caused the wealthy
families that previously lived in
Shahri Kona to move out and into
Shahri Now and rent their homes in
Shahri Kona to poorer families. This
caused an increase in density and the
rate of poverty among residents in
the Old City.
If modern meant new, then an
Image 3.6: Map of the City of Kabul, Shahri Now and Shahri Kona extracted (Afghanistan Information Management Services,
2005)
obvious preference would be made
to modernity, not only physically, but
psychologically in everything that
Shahri Now became. Amanullah in
his time used a strategy of "spatial
ordering" (Calogero, 2011) in the
layout of Kabul Jadid, as was the case
in Egypt before the British occupied
the country in 1882. In Egypt, the
Khedive built orthogonal towns as a
means of psychologically controlling
the population with a technology of
rule representing the political order
that exists to today in Shahri Now
(Calogero, 2011). The Musahibans 2
were not as explicit in creating a
visually modern urban order, but this
order did exist, especially as patterns
of development were following
what was initially laid out with Kabul
Jadid. The way in which Shahri Now
was developed followed a pattern of
how gardens were patterned in the
city. These gardens were commonly
owned by aristocrats, so in this way
the aristocrats contributed to the
act of shaping the modern city. On a
different note, Afghan planners were
2 Musahibans were the reign of brothers
who ruled after Amanullah was overthrown
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recognizing the importance of having
a passive-solar urban housing type in
the 1940s, years before the West was
considering such things. (Calogero,
2011) See Image 3.7.
However, this is not to say that the
type of planning that occurred was
necessarily a positive one, because
while some planners were focused on
a passive-solar housing type to guide
the development of Shahri Now,
there was a subsequent process of
urban renewal in the inner-city was
occurring. The Jad-e Maiwand and
the Jad-e Nader Pashtun were built
starting in 1949 as enormous, straight
avenues that ran straight through the
Shahri Kona. Along these avenues,
big concrete buildings were built,
solidifying them, formalizing them.
Image 3.8: Shahri Now after 1935 (Google Earth)
This was an assurance that these
streets were now considered part
of, and served, the new section of
the city by guiding traffic, goods, and
customers flow to Shahri Now (Arez
& Dittman, 2005). Like most urban
Summer Sun,
shaded by tree
Street
PLAN of typical house SOUTHNORTH SECTION through two back-to-back houses (hauli)
Image 3.7: Lot and block configurations in a typical Afghan household (Calogero)
renewal projects throughout the
world, the urban renewal of Shahri
Kona was successful in connecting
commerce with the core of the city.
(Nemat, 1976)
But it is not our place to say what
the planners in Kabul should
have done at that point. Ananya
Roy identifies a "management of
difference" asserting that the act of
urban conservation under situations
of colonization is actually another
technology of rule that colonial
powers use to control their supposed
colonies. The very fact that Afghan
35
STAKING SPACE PLANNING, PUBLIC SPACE, AND VISIONS OF THE SUBALTERN
planners wanted and could take part
in urban renewal was an actual mark
of their sovereignty. (Calogero, 2011)
Amanullah had planned out
concentric districts that are known
in Farsi as kart, with Darulaman
as the center. The zones were to
be planned with Karta-i-Awal as
administrative, Kart-i-Duwom as
commercial and Karta-i-Sey and
any subsequent karts as residential.
Though all the neighborhoods were
not exactly developed according
to Amanullah's plans, they all
maintained a strong trace of Kabul
Jadid and its relationship to it.
Karta-i-Char is a residential area,
and though Karta-i-Awal is not being
used for administrative purposes,
the Afghan government still owns
the land. Still, around Darulaman,
many organizations such as the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, the Kabul National
Museum, and the American
University of Kabul have established
their bases indicating that Kabul
Jadid still influences land uses in this
area of Kabul even to today. This
shows that Afghans did dapple with
and experience modern planning in a
manner that allowed this experience
to have an influence on the shape of
the city. Though in subsequent years,
Soviet-influenced planning played a
greater role in the development of
Kabul and the country, the common
discourse implies that this Soviet
inspired transnational planning was
exactly just that-a model taken
from Western models. Calogero
argues, "though Amanullah's Beaux-
Arts planning might have explicitly
emulated Western models, the
socio-political bargaining of the
years of rule following the overthrow
of Amanullah produced an urban
modernity that can be classified as
distinctly Afghan." (Calogero, 2011)
Image 3.8: Urban districts
1923.1963(Calogero)
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3.3 LEAD UP TO THE COLD WAR
Amanullah declared war on the British
in 1919, which soon gained them
independence. Therefore in 1920
Afghanistan became one of the few
Asian states that had full sovereignty
from any imperial power (Wild,
1982). Soon after, the Musahibans in
an effort to protect this sovereignty
joined the League of Nations in 1934
to ensure this. This independence
became an important part of
the urban landscape throughout
Kabul such as in the Independence
Monument near Deh Mazang, the
Monument to the Unknown Soldier
which is located at the intersection
of Jad-e Maiwand and Jad-e Nader
Pashtun in Shahri Kona.
However, the buildup and the
onslaught of the Cold War put
Afghanistan and the Musahibans in
a precarious position. As American
President Dwight Eisenhower saw
the Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal
Nehru's non-alignment as siding
with the USSR and a refusal of being
part of the Western Bloc, he gained
Mahmoud as the
(Ahmadi, 2006)
neighboring Pakistan as an ally and
provided them with military and
political affiliation with the United
States in the Cold War. Afghanistan,
seeing the Durand Treaty as void
after India gained independence
from Great Britain, did not recognize
Pakistan as an official state, and
instead border tensions arose
between the two countries. The
border is still a source of contention
between Afghanistan and Pakistan to
this day, as Afghanistan was unable
to balance the interests of powers
in South Asia against the Soviets to
the north in a manner that Afghan
leaders had always done (Calogero,
2011). Meanwhile the United
States reinstated the Shah of Iran
by overthrowing the democratically
elected Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadegh so that the US would
have an ally in the Persian Gulf
(Kinzer, 2003). In Afghanistan, Prime
Minister Shah Mahmoud Khan was
overthrown after he lost credibility
within the country; King Zahir Shah's
cousin, Daoud Khan, succeeded Shah
Prime Minister.
Developmental assistance arose as
the competition between the Eastern
and Western Bloc became more
serious and Cold War players wanted
to gain support from political allies
around the world. Under Daoud
Khan, Prime Minister Shah Mahmoud
Khan sought and received a great
deal of development assistance from
the Soviet Union casting Afghanistan
into a much more aggressive period
of modernization while the United
States seemingly ignored Afghanistan
at this time, almost thrusting the
country into the arms of the Soviet
Union. (Calogero, 2011)
Figure 3.9: Independence Monument, Deh
Mazang (Calogero)
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3.4 SOVIET URBAN PLANNING
Premier Nikita Khrushchev was
different than Joseph Stalin in that
instead of solely focusing on quick
industrialization, he considered and
realized the value of urbanization
that occurred in parallel with
industrialization and acted upon
this by instilling urban development
programs in the Soviet Union. In
addition, many of the perspectives
that Khrushchev and the Soviets held
at that time about the theory of city
form were passed down to Afghan
planners, as development assistance
was funneled through the country.
The Soviets were heavily influenced
from the very beginning by the urban
planning mechanisms and beliefs
of Ebenezer Howard who physically
presented his ideas to the Soviet
Union, on top of being well known by
Socialists and social-justice reformers
in Great Britain. His theories of
comprehensive urban planning, for
example and belief that there was
an appropriate size to cities were
incorporated in Afghan planning.
(French, 1994)
Urban green space also became a
very important aspect of Afghan
planning and is even reflected in
conversations with Afghans today.
The Soviet Union developed urban
parks and green spaces across the
USSR, as a means of "marrying the
best traits of the city and country
together" (Howard, 1902). This effect
is most directly evident in Afghan
planning today where in the Master
Plans of Kabul, a large proportion
of the city was dedicated to green
space. In 2008, the mayor of Kabul
described the need to create these
green spaces as "lungs of the city,"
an important and key phrase of the
Garden City movement. Sadly, the
type of parkland that is desired by
Kabulis and Afghan planners is almost
undoable because of the scarcity of
water and the demand for housing in
Kabul. Yet it is interesting to see how
the Garden Cities movement affected
Kabul through the Soviet planning
principles that were transferred via
technical assistance throughout
the time of the buildup to and the
actuality of the Cold War. (Calogero,
2011)
Housingwas also an issuethat became
transferred to Afghan planners due to
the concern of the shortage of urban
housing in Soviet cities. Following
principles of mass-produced housing,
designs from Bauhaus (Sherwood,
1978) and Le Corbusier's (Corbusier,
1927) advocacy of high-rise housing
and super-blocks, played a major
role in addressing the housing needs
of Kabul. Mikrorayons, which were
mass produced apartment blocks,
with many major components housed
within and shared infrastructure
were. As seen in Image 3.10 and
Image 3.10: Typical Mikrorayon (Krogius)
38
Chapter 3 Kabul Jadid
3.11, open space was a common
space, encouraging of leisurely time
spent and enjoyed by everyone as a
whole in an open arena. (Calogero,
2011)
Furthermore, in an attempt to
transform and guide the psyche
of urban dwellers through spatial
transformations, urban planning and
the development of Mikrorayons
aimed to do just that. Relations
between the early Soviet Union
and Afghanistan were very cordial.
The Soviets called Amanullah the
Red Prince because his efforts to
modernize Afghan society paralleled
the material-spatial efforts of the
rEHEPAAL
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Soviet Union in their efforts at
revolutionary social transformation.
They saw Amanullah's Kabul Jadid
as bringing Afghanistan towards
proletarian communism. The
development of the first Mikrorayon
in Kabul began very shortly after the
Soviets had built a prototype of the
region in Moscow. (Calogero, 2011)
It is apparent, therefore, that even
before current attempts at modernity
by Western powers, the Soviets
believed in and pursued the concept
of social control and governmental
enforcement, the Soviet version
of rational-comprehensive
planning. Throughout the 30 years
of development assistance, this
method of rational-comprehensive
planning was undoubtedly passed
onto Afghans who were willing to
receive this transmission in guidance.
(Krogius)
Image 3.11: Plans of Mikrorayon 1 and 2 (Calogero)
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3.5 FIRST MASTER PLAN
Before the First Master Plan of
Kabul was even formulated in
1964, Afghanistan was already
looking ahead to national economic
development and thus producing
five year plans for this very type of
development. There is significant
evidence that the First and Second
Master Plans portray the Soviets as
playing a major role in influencing
methods and assumptions about
what master-planning was and how
it was to be completed. For instance,
the survey map of Kabul in 1963
used as a basis for the First Master
Plan was put together in Moscow.
In addition, in 1963, the Soviets
built and educated the staff of the
Polytechnic University of Kabul in
1963 and the Housing Construction
Unit in 1965. A French planner led
the First Master Plan, the major
project completed under this plan
was Mikrorayon 1, a derivative of
Soviet high-rise apartment complex
planning. (Calogero, 2011)
Calogero has developed the
following two master plans at the
same scale, using the same graphic
conventions in order to indicate the
continuity between the Master Plans
and how, with each revision, there
has been a growing sophistication of
the planners. The figure on the next
page shows how in the First Master
Plan of Kabul in 1964, the plan
proposed replacing most of the Old
City (A) with public uses. The main
areas of the Arg (B), Shahri Now (C),
Kabul University (D), and Darulaman
Palace (E) are proposed to remain as
is. Though the First Master Plan did
Source: Ghulam Dastagir, Senior Planner, Plan Implementation Office,
Table 3.1: Master Plans of Kabul (Calogero)
not show specifically dedicated open
space, the undeveloped mountainous
areas and the belt along the Kabul
River look to be dedicated open
space, while the following master
plans confirmed that this space
does become planned open space.
(Calogero, 2011)
City of Kabul (May 2007)
Master Plan Year Projected Allowed
No. (AH/AD) Population Floors Participants
First 1343/1964 800,000 French-led team of 15 expatriates
Second 1346/1970 1,200,000 6 UNDP-led team from 35 countries
1357- USSR-led team from CZ, GDR, IN,
Third 8/1978 2,000,000 16 AU
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3.6 THE SECOND MASTER PLAN
By the time it was time to formulate
the Second Master Plan, there was a
shift in attemptingto guide the growth
of the population by an additional
300,000 people. The Second Master
Plan designated specific areas for
green space and industry, in addition
to developing single family homes.
(Calogero, 2011)
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3.7 THIRD MASTER PLAN
This Master Plan was intended to
guide Kabul's growth to a 2 million
person population over the course of
25 years. The former Mayor of Kabul,
Ghulam Siddiq Noorzad, a major
proponent of the Third Master Plan
was quoted in the Wall Street Journal
saying "It's a perfect plan made
by top engineers from Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria,
and India" (Cloud, 2005). The
Third Master Plan promoted a high
residential density as a way to sustain
the projected growth of 2 million
without the necessity of sprawl;
second, the Logar Riverway and part
of the Kabul River are designated
as aquifer-recharge areas, which
until this day, the City pumps its
water supply. Potable water is, and
always has been, a very important
and scarce resource in Kabul. The
integration of this into the Master
Plan was paramount in having this
concern addressed and recognized
by the government. (Calogero, 2011)
However, as I, and some other
planners view this Third Master
Plan, it is as though this 1978 plan
is literally a graphic representation
of how the city should be developed
into a Modernist city. Abdur-Rashid
Janbaz, the City Economic Planning
Director indicated that the City fully
intended to relocate the informal
residents who would be displaced
in this plan outside of the borders
of Kabul, rebuild the informal areas
consistent with the Master Plan,
and then bring them back and settle
them into the newly built formal
housing. This, of course, poses many
issues. Afghans have been temporary
relocated for longer terms than
intended, just as millions of Afghans
had already lived for the past twenty-
five years in refugee camps set up in
Pakistan, and much like Palestinians
have been living for the past sixty
ears in temporary camps outside
their homes (Calogero, 2011).
Another concern was of course
the social networks that would be
heavily disrupted upon this proposed
relocation. As Janice Perlman noted
in Rio de Janeiro, the government's
new social housing and relocation of
slum-dwellers back into the formal
housing after they had been initially
displaced, disrupted their intact
family and social life. (Perlman, 2004)
Image 3.14 and 3.15 show what
architects identify as a high-
Modernist style. "Modernism as
a formal style is one expression of
modernity; but another dimension
of modernity as a condition of urban
political economy is expressed by
the informal housing climbing up
the slope of the mountain behind
the Polytechnic," Calogero identifies
the juxtaposition of the formal and
informal in modernity.
The favoring of a beautiful building,
plaza is displayed in Image 3.15,
along with an informal settlement
encroaching from behind. Image
3.14 is a concept sketch of modern
downtown which the House Building
Unit of Kabul made in 1981. Urban
informality is just as much an
indicator and signifier of modernity
as is a modernist building like the
Polytechnic. There is a tendency,
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especially in Modernist design and
the development trade to assume
that a one-size fits all models exists
and can be successfully implemented
in places regardless of the cultural
context. These "best practices"
are established in a manner to
Image 3.14: Modern downtown, 1931 (House
Building Unit via Calogero)
Image 3.15: Kabul Polytechnic (Calogero)
be replicated, as is outlined in
Rule of Experts a critique of there
being "principles true in every
country" (Mitchell, 1988). Clients
in various countries expect and
request American building codes.
These codes embody a number of
assumptions specific to American
buildings, obviously. The dimensions
work, however, it serves to create
a particular type of physical space.
When transnational clients expect
this type of space, a homogenization
of designed and built spaces across
nations exist. Political factors, efforts
of control; the physical-determinist
argument that not only should 'good
design result in good people,' but
'bad design produces bad people.'
(Calogero, 2011)
However, Henri Lefebvre and
Michel de Certeau attribute
modernity to what one experiences
in their everyday life, ultimately
a psychological condition. The
continuation of modernizing political
rationalities from Amanullah
onward allowed Kabul to modernize
throughout 73 years even though
political powers shifted and changed
in parallel. Though Amanullah's
policies have been considered over-
the-top by many, Afghans today look
back on Amanullah's reforms as a king
who was able to gain full sovereignty
and that the policies he instilled
were ones Afghans had a hand in.
Some even look back on Amanullah's
regime with nostalgia, as a time when
Afghanistan was able to compete
in development with the rest of the
world. And though Nader Shah (king,
1930-1933) and Zahir Shah (king,
1933-1973) had their own hesitations
with the extent to which Amanullah
took his policies and programs, both
Shah and Gregorian point out that
these Musahiban rulers continued
many of their own modernization
programs. By the time Afghanistan
reached the 1950s, the King at the
time, Daoud Shah, became actively
involved in military reform with the
Soviets and promoted a more public
role for women. (Calogero, 2011)
The Afghan Civil War of 1992-1996
destroyed much of the Old City,
leaving a very miniscule remainder
of what is considered "traditional"
urban fabric in Kabul. Thus any new
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development that did not match
an orthogonal street and lot layout
indicated in the Third Master Plan
or failed to use modern building
materials was ultimately considered
the anti-modern. Yet because the
concrete-production factories were
destroyed in either the Civil War or
the Coalition bombing of industrial
facilities in 2001, concrete became
too expensive for poor households
to even afford. Ironic in that, if a
development regime remained and
continued after 1992, households
would have been able to afford
this concrete and assert their
permanence on the land. So though
a large number of urban residents
explicitly violate the Master Plan,
especially in the case of building
materials, the Kabul Municipality
would like to reassert their position
in obtaining full sovereignty over
the space and population of Kabul.
So though they "quietly encroach"
(Bayat, 2000) collectively in order to
secure their livelihood, the reality is
that the urban elite is not providing
the means to afford modernizing
that is explicitly required in the plan.
(Calogero, 2011)
46

STAKING SPACE PLANNING, PUBLIC SPACE, AND VISIONS OF THE SUBALTERN
CHAPTER FOUR
THE REEMERGENCE OF THE
MASTER PLAN
In 2004, Ghulam Sakhi Noorzad was appointment as the Mayor of Kabul, after he had
served as Mayor in 1978 when the Third Master Plan was ratified. Noorzad saw having an
actual plan as the main way to restore a functioning government in Kabul and restoring
Kabul into an orderly city. Though many believed that progress came to a standstill during
times of political instability in Afghanistan, the cranes Image 4.1 in Mikrorayon 4 clearly
depict the persistence of the implementation of the Master Plan from 1978 to 1992.
Noorzad's biggest challenge was to try and convince the Ministry that Plan Implementation
should resume in face of the removal of the majority of the informal housing in Kabul.
Noorzad butt heads with the Ministry of the Interior, which eventually resulted in an
official suspension of the Master Plan in 2005. (Calogero, 2011)
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4.1 MUNICIPALITY AND MINISTRY TENSION
In politics at play, the Municipality of
Kabul has been gaining a significant
amount of support and backing
by the Afghan people, whereas
the national government, and
consequently the Ministries have
been consistently losing credibility.
Afghan President, Hamid Karzai has
been having a difficult time finding a
Mayor for Kabul that works well with
the Ministry, and so the Third Master
Plan remains suspended as the Plan
Implementation Office is waiting for
further direction from the Ministry
of Urban Development. The Kabul
Municipality has been implementing
the Master Plan, however just the
components involving the road
framework. They are able to finance
this road construction by setting a
price themselves of property they
have expropriated, and then resell
this land at an exponentially higher
amount after the adjacent road has
been built. The Municipality is able to
act in complete independence from
the Ministry because of a Municipal
Law enacted in 1990 makes the
Kabul Municipality officially part of
the national government. Therefore,
Municipality leaders need not report
to their provincial governors as every
other municipality has to. Instead,
they report directly to the President.
President Karzai who has replaced
the Mayor of Kabul multiple times in
an effort to create a working dynamic
between the Municipality and
Ministry has consistently reaffirmed
this privileged position. The Interior
Minister appoints every other mayor.
Thus, the Municipality is able to
collect and raise its own revenues
and have their budget approved by
the Ministry of Finance, just as other
ministries are. It is through this
unique ability that the Municipality
has been able to proceed with the
implementation of certain parts of
the Third Master Plan. (Calogero,
2011)
Thus, Kabul is in a position of
competition with the national
government, not with other Afghan
cities, especially when it comes to
how the city's path and process of
development can, should, and will be
controlled and governed (Calogero,
2011). It is clear that the Municipality
is asserting its power over the
development of the city. The Master
Plan represents a commitment
on behalf of the government. It
represents stability and permanence
in a time where there is extreme
economic and political uncertainty.
The Plan displays intentionality and
clarity in the face of vagueness and
unclear commitments and loyalties of
the national government. The Afghan
public is therefore in favor of the plan,
especially the taxi drivers. While
foreigners and Afghan-Americans
have no real idea of what the Master
Plan comprises and what the actual
geometry of it is, taxi drivers have a
deep understanding and relationship
to the Plan. The lack of information
and actual wording in the Plan
has been deliberately secretive, a
way of asserting the Municipality's
position as the urban-regime and
their intentionality in guiding this
development in the wake of many
groups hiding their regime status and
intentions with the city. Calogero
says of the Third Master Plan, "There
is extensive documentation for Plan 3
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Table 4. -- NATIONAL URBAN PLANNING AGENCIES; REORGANIZATIONS AND
RELATED EVENTS
Urbanization and Housing Unit created with Ministry of Public Works
1961 (MoPW)
1963: King Zahir Shah pressures Daoud Khan to resign as both Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense. Zahir convenes constitutional
commission, begins'decade of democracy'
1964: First Master Plan adopted
1965 Unit is upgraded to the Bureau of Urbanization, within MoPW
Bureau upgraded to Directorate of Urbanization and Housing within
1967 MoPW
1970: Second Master Plan adopted
1973: King Zahir Shah deposed by his cousin Daoud Khan; Republic of
Afghanistan proclaimed
1978: Daoud Khan assassinated by a faction of the Peoples Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), who proclaim the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan
1978: Third Master Plan adopted
Directorate becomes an 'independent non-profit government enterprise':
1978 the Institute of Urban and Structural Projects Creation (sazi), abbrevieted
as ShTaPa from the full Pashto name
ShTaPa becomes the Central Institute for Project Creation, abbrevieted as
1984 PAMA
1989 PAMA becomes the Central Administration of Urbanization
Najibullah resigns; mujahideen factions proclaim the Islamic State of
1992 Afghanistan. PAMA is upgraded to the Ministry of Urban Development
and Housing (MUDH)
The Taliban capture Kabul and proclaim the Islamic Emirate of
1996 Afghanistan. MUDH is downgraded again to PAMA and is placed under
the Ministry of Public Works again
2001 PAMA upgraded again to Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
2005 "Housing" is dropped from the name and the mission of the Ministry,
which becomes the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD)
Figure 4.1: Ahmad Shah Hemat, Ministry of Urban Development via Calogero
Reemergence of the Master Plan
in the Office of Plan Implementation
in Park Shah r-e Naw. So far as I know,
no Westerner has been allowed to
see it (including me). I don't even
know if it is in Farsi or Russian."
The taxi drivers of Kabul were in
favor of the Plan more than most
supporters of the Plan. Their main
push was in completing the roadways
of the Master Plan. In addition to
being well versed in the city's plans
and the Master Plan, the taxi drivers
are also the most vocal group among
the entire city. Inside the taxicabs is
where public space actually occurs.
People may or may not interact with
each other among different groups
in designated public spaces of Kabul,
but they most certainly speak to
and interact with the cab drivers.
However, they not only listen to
the public concerns within these
cabs, they also relay information;
this produces a circular flow of
information, where the taxi drivers
receive various points of views and in
turn relay them to others in the cab.
The City has fully realized the extent
of this knowledge and power, and
thus have enlisted the support of this
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faction of the public on the topic of
roadways. (Calogero, 2011)
Figure 4.1 shows the political
instability of Afghanistan. It is
apparent that federal level control
over urban development has gone
through various stages of control
and lack of control ever since
the Master Plan was formulated
and adopted. However, the Kabul
Municipality's Plan-Making Office
has remained in place for a number
of years. Polanyi would call this
Municipal Plan-Making Office a
"socially embedded" institution .The
Municipality is free from having to
adhere to very strict accountability
standards in their project proposals
because they do not have to interact
often with multilateral agencies and
donors. Currently, the Ministry is
working on forming the Kabul Urban
Reconstruction Project (KURP), which
though well implemented, is very
slow paced and small in its scale not
allowing it to adequately address the
growth rate of the city. (Calogero,
2011)
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4.2 MINISTRY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT ATTEMPTS AT FORMAL URBANIZATION
While the Kabul Municipality has
continued to retain control over urban
development within the confines
of the city of Kabul, the Ministry of
Urban Development issued a revised
version of Amanullah's plan, entitling
it Kabul Jadid/Dih Sabz Plan in 2009.
This has given them the ability to
proceed with implementing formal
development, but only in areas where
the Municipality does not retain
control. This could be seen as one of
two things: the federal government is
desiringto make moneyfromthe real-
estate development deals; or that the
federal government has completely
given up trying to guide development
within the Municipal boundaries
(Calogero, 2011). This has ultimately
led to an inconsistency in much of
the terminology and maps. While
completing a GIS project for Kabul,
I noted that the shapefiles were
inconsistent in the spelling of names
and even upon political boundaries,
and subdivisions. This made it almost
impossible to join tables and combine
data across different shapefiles to
depict a graphical representation of
Afghanistan through a map.' It was
simply not feasible. In this paper, I
have elected to utilize the spelling
in the maps produced by AIMS, as I
refer to it most often.
The Kabul Jadid of 2009 made it clear
that the Ministry wanted full control
over the northward expansion
of Kabul into Dih Sabz, therefore
denying and flat out rejecting any
of the Municipality's attempts at
development here, even though this
has already ocurred. Still though,
this urban development both by the
Municipality and Ministry is formal, it
is following a plan of action laid out in
their respective plans.
However, the tension between the
two organizations has resulted in an
interference with investmentin Kabul.
Because Karzai formally suspended
the Third Master Plan of Kabul, there
has been a hesitation in purchasing
In this paper, I have elected to utilize the
spelling in maps produced by AIMS, as I
refer to this map most often
land throughout the city because it
is unclear who has planning rights in
the given areas. What if someone
was to purchase land and either the
Ministry or the Municipality were
to expropriate the land at a mere
fraction of what someone paid for
it? This uncertainty affects the
construction of the physical city and
the social relations that are produced
or put off.
In addition, because of this growing
tension, the two agencies have
not been paying enough deserved
attention to the return of millions of
refugees who have moved back into
the city. Because the Ministry does
not want to make a plan to follow the
Third Master Plan, and has instead
issued the Kabul Jadid/Dih Sabz plan,
this represents the fragmentation of
the urban elite that is now planning
in areas where they maintain control,
indicating the lack of administrative
coherence between the Municipality
and the Ministry. (Calogero, 2011)
Lastly, it is unclear when the
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Municipality will begin to clear out
informal development and replace
it with formal development. This
produces an ambiguity because the
Municipality has been implementing
parts of the Third Master Plan,
indicatingthatthe clearing of informal
housing is in the works. Refusing to
legalize informal developments is
intentional and planned, regardless
of understanding the distress these
households are in and how much
their livelihoods depend on them.
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CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGY
After assessing Western policies in Kabul, Afghanistan and the history and continuation of
planning in Afghanistan under the various political forces that have existed in the country,
the goal of this thesis is to have a clear understanding of how the Afghan public have
determined for themselves what their public spaces have been, in light of the changing
regimes and apparent instability of the city. While the implementation and the actual
wording of Kabul Jadid, the First, Second, and Third Master Plan are not readily available
to those not working in the City Plan Implementation Office, people interacting with,
or who have interacted with, the City of Kabul have a distinct understanding of the
spaces throughout the city. With their knowledge, I am seeking to understand Kabul
on a neighborhood level, allowing me to see where people from different backgrounds,
neighborhoods, income levels, and ages, have typically gathered. In doing so, I hope to
determine the characteristics of these spaces...are they near particular neighborhoods,
tourist centers, or parks? Are they at the crossroads of particular streets? Dotheycome with
certain amenities and are they green spaces? With this information, I hope to determine
the future of these public spaces with the little that is known about the implementation
of the Third Master Plan and its intention of the demolition of informal housing. The
research will utilize qualitative data collection methods as future recommendations rely
on the importance of the social, cultural, and spatial way people have interacted with
Kabul.
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5.1 SUMMARY OF DATA COLLECTION METHODS
There have been two primary
methods in which I have collected
data for this research. First, there
has been extensive document
review through connections I have
established inside and outside of
Afghanistan. Next, I have utiilized
what has been made available online
and through library archives. These
include historical maps that were
created from the time of Amanullah
Khan onward, interviews given
by prominent Afghan politicians
who have played a major role in
shaping the city of Kabul, as well as
those who worked in the physical
planning of Afghanistan in various
capacities whether bureaucratic or
through development. My second
method of data collection has been
through extensive interviews I have
conducted of people who have lived,
worked, or gone to school in the city
of Kabul. These people have ranged
in their demographic characteristics
in age, income, level of education,
and the particular neighborhoods
they associate themselves with.
Lastly, a number of photographs that
were taken by me and my colleagues
during our respective time in Kabul
has been used to assess certain
sections of Kabul and street life.
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5.2 EXTENDED METHODOLOGY
Data collection primarily consisted of
interviews with those who have lived,
worked, or were educated in Kabul.
After posting an announcement
through various social mediums
including Facebook, Twitter, and an
email to various Afghan listservs, I
reached out to Afghan community
organizations in California and
Virginia, two states with sizable
Afghan populations. I compiled a list
of interested participants (n=200),
who then completed an initial
survey that collected information
on how long they were educated,
lived in, or worked in Kabul, their
ages, neighborhoods, reasons for
leaving Afghanistan (if they were
not currently living there), their
income at the time they were living
in Kabul, and the ethnic group they
most closely identified with, if any
at all. From this pool of Afghans, I
chose 100 participants who varied
among these variables, in order to
encompass a range of positions and
Afghans who come from different
communities and backgrounds.
However, I oversampled those who
had the longest and most recent
duration of time in Kabul in order to
accurately depict the city as it stands
today in the midst of the Third Master
Plan implementation.
Subsequently, I formulated a semi-
structured survey interview with
all 100 participants. These were
conducted in person if the person
was local, and over Skype calls if
the person was not. The questions
were to gauge an understanding of
where they spent the majority of
their time in relation to where they
lived, worked, or went to school.
They were also to determine where
they thought were the most crowded
spaces, and the kinds of activities that
took place there. When asking these
questions, I used a map I obtained
from AIMS (see appendix) as it is
the most recently updated publicly
available map that most Afghans
have viewed which incorporates the
city as it stands at time of publishing.
This map allowed interviewees to
identify neighborhoods and spaces
without misinterpretation of these
spaces on my part. When interviews
were conducted over Skype, I ensured
that they had access to this map,
through email or through a family
member who printed it for them, in
the case of the elderly. In addition,
various questions on the subject of
modernity were asked; what the
term meant to each person, whether
they would consider any particular
section of Kabul to be modern, and
what they identified as the modern
spaces outside of Afghanistan.
Questions of modernity were asked
in order to gauge an understanding
of the spatial reference point of what
modernity was for the interviewees.
Lastly, I conducted numerous follow-
up interviews in order to clarify
locations of certain neighborhoods
and spaces that were initially
mentioned in the interview in order
to maintain consistency. Maps were
more heavily used during this section
of the interview to identify these
spaces.
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5.3 FIRST ROUND DATA COLLECTION
The initial survey of n=200 gathered
information upon the following
variables for each of the participants:
* Familial Identification and
Occupation
* Length of Time Spent in Kabul
e Age
e Political Situation in
Afghanistan Upon Leaving
e Ethnic Group
e Neighborhood From
FAMILIAL IDENTIFICATION AND
OCCUPATION
This inquiry was used as a filter; I
wanted to be extremely cautious of
the urban elite I was sampling from.
In Afghanistan, it is very clear that the
elite experience the city in a different
manner than the everyday citizens.
The urban elite often live in gated
communities such as Wazir Akbar
Khan, with the capital available to
maneuver the city by taxi or by car,
and the ability to use the various
sections of Kabul. I also knew that
there would be a larger number of
these people accessible for interview
asthis isthe population of people who
were privileged enough (i.e. had the
financial and political connections)
to leave. Therefore this variable was
used as a filter. This information
was sensitive and therefore remains
confidential. Though these views and
opinions are valuable in their own
right, the manner in which I wish to
address this research is through the
eyes of the population of Afghanistan
that has been commonly disregarded
and slighted in the planning of the
city.
LENGTH OF TIME SPENT IN KABUL
This variable was primarily used as a
filtering variable, as well. In recent
years there have been a number of
people who have traveled to and
from Kabul for short periods of time.
Though these individuals and families
play an important role, I wanted a
more in depth understanding of the
city with a great deal of experience
moving about the city.
POLITICAL SITUATION IN
AFGHANISTAN UPON LEAVING
I identified this as an important
variable to consider when surveying
the initial group. The reason for this
was that the time these individuals
spent in Afghanistan under the given
political situation indicated how they
knew the city, through its various
changes, developments, destruction,
and progression. It became a valuable
nostalgic reflection upon how the
various political regimes imprinted
not only the city, but how the public
felt, identified, and remembered the
city. There were four categories for
these. (a) Pre-Soviet Occupation,
before 1979 (b) Soviet Occupation,
1979 - 1989 (c) Post-Soviet
Occupation + Mujahiddin, 1989-
1996 (d) Taliban Era 1990 - 2001 (e)
Post 9/11 and American Occupation
2001 - Present (f) Still Resident in
Afghanistan.
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W Still in Afghanistan
E Post 9/11
Soviet Era
EPostSoviet+ Mujahidden Era
Pre Soviet Occupation
ETaliban Era
Figure 4.2: Breakdown of responses for political situation in Kabul at time of leaving the country (author)
6% 4% 1% 0%
I Pashtuns
* Tajik
Hazara
*Others
Uzbek
i Turkmen
W Balochi
Figure 4.3: Breakdown of responses for ethnicities (author)
AGE
This variable is closely related to
the previous variable. People from
Afghanistan have been moving out
in waves for a myriad of reasons,
spanning from receiving an education
Pre-Soviet era, to leaving as refugees
during the Soviet Occupation and
Taliban rule, leaving for education
today. These reasons had an effect
on what age they left and at what age
they experienced the city spaces.
ETHNIC GROUP
At the crossroads of the Silk Road,
the empire of Alexander the Great,
Genghis Khan, and the Persian Empire,
Afghanistan is comprised of various
ethnic groups. Kabul, as the capital
and center of the country atracted
a variety of these groups. According
to a National Geographic Society
map, the city of Kabul is comprised
of 45% Tajiks, 25% Hazaras, 25%
Pashtuns, 2% Uzbeks, 1% Baluchis,
1% Turkmen, and 1% classified as
Other. As there are a variety of ethnic
enclaves within the city of Kabul, this
variable was important to consider
to ensure there would be a sizable
sampling from a variety of ethnic
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groups across the entire city from
different neighborhoods.
NEIGHBORHOOD FROM
The neighborhood each of the
interviewees were from or identified
most closely with. This variable
was especially important in the first
stage of interviews in that it also
served as a means to ensure that
a variety of different populations
and neighborhoods were being
represented from across the entire
city. Although utilized to provide a
representative sample to begin with
in the first round of interviews, later
when more detailed questions were
asked, this variable proved to be
important because correlations and
mapping could be made between the
neighborhoods residents lived, and
in what spaces they spent time.
Initially, I considered looking at
other variables, such as reasons why
residents left Kabul, if they were not
currently in Kabul, or if they were
not planning on returning in the
immediate future. This information
was entirely omitted, as it was
a 45-60
0 60+
18-30
a 30-45
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sensitive information. There are a
number of Afghan residents who are
here under political asylum or here
illegally, therefore the incorporation
of this information was not directly
related to the purpose of this
research.
Figure 4.4: Breakdown of responses for age groups (author)
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5.4 SECOND ROUND INTERVIEWS
Following these initial interviews,
due to both time constraints and to
oversample certain variables, I used
Familial Identification/Occupation
and Length of Time Spent in
Afghanistan as the primary filters and
an indicator of who might be able to
provide detailed information about
Kabul. I then oversampled those
who had most recently spent time in
Kabul, and those who had spent the
longest amount of time in Kabul.
The second set of interviews
provided me information away from
individual demographic information
and to more about Kabul and the
interviewees' relationships to it. The
following are the topics that were
addressed further:
* Spaces and Neighborhoods
Spent Time In
* Spaces and Neighborhoods
they Noticed Others Spending
Time In
* What Modernity Meant
* Spaces in Kabul that Fit
this Definition
e Cities Outside of Kabul
and Afghanistan Fitting this
Definition
SPACES AND NEIGHBORHOODS
SPENT TIME IN
This variable was an especially
valuable component of the research,
as it indicates where people
used public spaces and for what
reasons, but also, paired with which
neighborhoods individuals were
from, this variable indicated where
individuals spent their time in and
for what reasons. It showed whether
people spent time in the immediate
vicinity of where they lived or
worked, or if they traveled to various
spaces in the city where they spent
time. It also indicated whether these
spaces were spaces designated by
the city as a public space, or whether
the public staked their own spaces
throughout the city. This variable
also turned into a commentary of
the political situation of the time.
When paired with when people left
Kabul, the spaces that people spent
time in varied, from inside the home
for women during the time of the
Taliban, to the Mikrorayons Pre-
Soviet Occupation, to Shari Now
post-9/11 and during the heavy
investment in development today.
When paired with whether people
were in Kabul by themselves or
with family, this variable shed light
on where the places were that
individuals spent time in with their
families, by themselves, or with
friends and colleagues.
SPACES AND NEIGHBORHOODS
THEY NOTICED OTHERS SPENDING
TIME IN
In the case that individuals may have
limited time spent in Kabulorin public
spaces, this variable was an indicator
of where they noticed others
spending time. This was valuable
given what the political situation was
when these individuals were in Kabul,
their gender, and familial affiliation
and what that said about how they
spent their time in spaces in relation
to others, especially in the wake of
heavy foreign presence in Kabul in
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the later years.
WHAT MODERNITY MEANT TO
THEM
Because I was attempting to garner
information on the theme of
modernity from people in Kabul, I
determined it vital to learn individual
definitions of modernity itself.
ANY SPACE IN KABUL THAT FITS THIS
DEFINITION
This question was asked to see if they
considered any space in Kabul that fit
this definition. This was interesting
when paired with the variable of
what neighborhoods people spent
time in in Kabul, whether this space
was modern in Kabul, or whether
these were the areas people did not
venture to, felt excluded from, etc.
WHAT CITIES OUTSIDE OF KABUL
AND AFGHANISTAN FIT THIS
DEFINITION
I wanted to see what the spatial
reference point was for modernity
and how this differed based upon
where people were currently and
at what time they left Kabul. Aihwa
Ong and Ananya Roy refer to in
"Worlding Cities" that Asia is the
spatial reference point of modernity
for many in Southeast Asia, and it
is no longer America. This proved
interesting when comparing to the
image of modernity the West has
made for itself in that it defines its
own modernity based upon all that is
not modern in the developing world.
63
STAKING SPACE PLANNING, PUBLIC SPACE, AND VISIONS OF THE SUBALTERN
5.5 100 AFGHANS.
The following is detailed information
on the n=100 Afghans I have chosen
to focus on much more closely.
22%1-0
* 46-60O
604-
0 31-45
Figure 4.5: Breakdown of responses for age groups (author)
1% 1%
7% N Pashtuns
Tajik
i Hazara
iOthers
Uzbek
Turkmen
i'Balochi
Figure 4.6: Breakdown of responses for ethnicities (author)
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* United Arab
Emirates
* East Asian Citie
South Asian
Cities
* The West
Other
Figure 4.7: Breakdown of responses for modern cities (author)
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& Still n Afghanistan
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Figure 4.8: Breakdown of responses for political situation in Kabul at time of
leaving the country (author)
Figure 4.9: Breakdown of responses for most frequented spaces in
Kabul (author)
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5.6 METHOD ANALYSIS
After completing the interviews,
I mapped out the neighborhoods
people lived in and the spaces they
spent the majority of their time
in while in Kabul. Using different
markers for each, this gave me
the ability to see, from my pool of
interviewees, whether there was a
minimal correlation between the
two. It also allowed me to determine
where most people spent their time,
regardless of their neighborhood.
After completing this mapping
exercise, I chose the three spaces that
emerged as the most frequented.
These three spaces were Shahri Now,
Mandawi, and Mikrorayon 3.
I conducted further research on
these spaces in order to determine
the characteristics of each. These
included general demographics of
the area surrounding the space, the
type of space it was, and how long
it had been there, in addition to
physical characteristics such as street
sizes.
What has emerged as a result of my
study and research is an interesting
narrative and understanding of the
city of Kabul depicted and told by
residents, refugees, immigrants, and
visitors, men and women, young
and old. An understanding of Kabul
partially reflected by nostalgia, and
partially reflecting upon what each
individual demands of the city.
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CHAPTER SIX
ANALYSIS
6.1 SHAHRI NOW
Shahri Now is located in the ISAF defined boundary of District 4 of Kabul, which is just
slightly North West of the center of the city. It is not the most crowded and busy of all
areas in Kabul, though it is the most frequented by the most diverse group of people from
a range of ethnic groups and income levels, and residents and expats. It is adjacent to the
wealthiest section of the city, Wazir Akbar Khan, though Wazir Akbar Khan is located in
District 10. Kolola Poshta, a neighborhood in District 4 and directly adjacent to the West
of the Shahri Now neighborhood is also a wealthy area. Sharara, another neighborhood
in the vicinity, was also a wealthy area. It is no longer considered as wealthy of an area
because of the population influx into the city and the settling of various groups into
Sharara.
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Image 6.1: Map
of the city of
Kabul, Shahri
Now extracted
(Afghanistan
Information
Management
Services,
2005))
Just south of Shahri Now, Salaang
Road forms part of the bottom
boundary of District 2 and becomes
the divisive mechanism separating
Shahri Now from the much poorer
neighborhood of Qoli Abchakan. This
road runs to Salaang, a prominent
area north of Kabul known for its
mountains and pristine river. Further
south to Qoli Abchakan are the
Asmayi Mountains, location of one
of the largest informal populations
in the city, which seem to provide
almost a fortified boundary to Shahri
Now.
Indicated through interviews and
personal experience, Shahri Now
has a feel to it allowing it to both
exist within Kabul and at the same
time be completely removed from
the city. Shahri Now also emerged
as what individuals identified as
among the most modern sections of
Kabul (second to the neighborhood
of Wazir Akbar Khan). The main
attractions of Shahri Now has been
Image 6.2: Map
of the city of
Kabul, Wazir
Akbar Khan,
Kolola Poshta,
and Sharara
extracted
(Afghanistan
Information
Management
Services, 2005)
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the multitude of restaurants that are
present, ranging from Chinese and
Italian, among others. In addition,
it has four hospitals in the vicinity
of District 2, and a number of hotels
catered to visitors of the city. The
Kabul Micro Finance building looms
over the Shahri Now Park, a symbol
of wealth, and opportunity.
When you are in Shahri Now, it
is like a tease. You see money in
front of you, you see Afghanha
who are spending it, and you
think that maybe you too deserve
that life. I just do not know how
to get it, but I can see it.
Said an interviewee who frequents
Shahri Now.
Shahri Now Park is one of the major
attractions that the public has
been able to utilize, as it is easily
Image 6.3: Map of the city of Kabul, Qoli Abchakan, Kohi Asmayi extracted (Afghanistan Information Management
accessible and free. Although not as
frequented by families because the
neighborhood is crowded, it is most
commonly frequented by young
adults who spend time in Shahri Now
to meet each other. In many ways
it supersedes some of the cultural
restrictions that have recently
emerged between female and male
relationships, in the sense that
these interactions take place under
the watchful eyes of community
members and elders, making them
acceptable. So though they are still
in a public space often times away
from family members, they inhabit
a muted way of Western interaction.
Shahri Now has a higher population
of foreigners, and these young adults
see themselves as assimilated into a
Western culture as they get to know
each other and the foreigners. As
one interview revealed:
Interviewee: I used to go to
Shahri Now after school and give
foreigners tours of the area. It
was for fun, We used to give them
tours of Shahri Now
Me: What did you see from these
tours?
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Interviewee: We began to see
what they liked and what they
were interested in.
Me: So why did you give these
tours?
Interviewee: Because we got to
make friends with people who
are not Afghan
Another interviewee laughed as he
recalled his memories of Shahri Now:
Interviewee: After work, I used
to take chicks to the one good
park behind our office in Shahri
Now.
Me: Afghan chicks?
Interviewee: No, not Afghans, all
other chicks...the international
ones.
Me: Why there?
Interviewee: It was clean, it
looked like Boston Garden, but
not as good. Chicks were smoking
cigarettes there, and I looked
good because I was their friend.
Shahri Now has then become the
arena in which a public space is
available that exposes Afghans
from various backgrounds to this
seemingly Western way of life with
latent opportunity and female/male
interactions. Though Wazir Akbar
Khan emerged in the interviews
as the most modern space in
Kabul, defined by each individual's
definition of modernity (a fascinating
connection on its own), it is primarily
residential. This has made common
spaces not as readily available to
outsiders, perpetuating a character
of exclusion; in essence, another
dollar that must be made for another
border that must be crossed. The
free movement in and out of Wazir
Akbar Khan into Shahri Now is easy
for the residents of WazirAkbar Khan,
a flow reserved only for Kabul's elite.
Many times, those who live in Wazir
Akbar Khan are the same people, the
urban elite, who are able to maintain
other types of flows. This is the flow
into and out of the country when the
situation in Afghanistan becomes
volatile. They are the privileged
elite who have options, and in turn
symbolically secure the borders of
their community as the West does
their own.
The underlying issue, however, is
not just how Shahri Now represents
modernity and accessibility to the
West to the residents of Kabul, but
how the implemented Third Master
Plan is going to affect Shahri Now
as this accessible space. Given the
strategic locations of Qoli Abchakan
and Kohi Asmayi both to a major road
in the city, Salaang Road, and the
neighborhood of Shahri Now, these
neighborhoods are in immediate
danger given the expressed concerns
and interests of plan implementors in
the Office. The neighborhoods in Kohi
Asmayi are especially threatened in
that they are informal residents of
the city, quietly encroaching upon
the city. This area and land, because
of their proximity to Shahri Now
and a major road in Afghanistan,
Salaang Road, are in danger of
repropriation. As the Municipality of
Kabul continues to assert their power
of the city and attempts to control
growth and bring in revenue for the
city, they may purchase this property
from residents, rebuild it with better
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Image 6.4: Map of the
city of Kabul, Wazir
Akbar Khan extracted
(Afghanistan Infor-
mation Management
Services, 2005)
accessibility for taxis, improve road
conditions, and then place the land
for sale at about 10 times the price
that it was initially valued. Even
with intentions of formalizing areas
such as Kohi Asmayi by removing its
residents until improvements are
made and then moving them back in,
there is the danger of disrupting long
standing social networks and ties.
In addition, there is no guarantee
that these residents will ever be
moved back into their homes. This
poses a great threat to the current
culture of Shahri Now. As better
roads are formed, informal housing
becomes formal, informal residents
are displaced, and thus more formal
neighborhoods begin to surround
Shahri Now, there is a quiet enclosing
of the neighborhood of Shahri Now in
a manner welcome only to those who
are actively taking part in eating at
the restaurants, visiting the hospitals,
and the exchanges occurring at the
bank. These better neighborhoods
form the type of boundary that Wazir
Akbar Khan does.
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A closer look at Wazir Akbar Khan can
show how planned and protected the
neighborhood is as shown in Image
6.5 and 6.6.
What may save Shahri Now from
gentrification may be that its Park
will still attract a similar group of
people that currently utilize the
space. However, the free movement
throughout the neighborhood will
be severely restricted and limited,
making it convenient for cars, and
less so for pedestrians outside of
the surrounding neighborhoods.
The proposed implementation
of the Third Master Plan with
its road improvements and ease
in accessibility through these
frequented sections of Kabul,
combined with the Municipalities
intentions of formalization and
upgrading the various areas around
Shahri Now threatens, marginalizes,
and gentrifies whole communities of
the surrounding neighborhoods that
actively use Shahri Now as a place
of leisure, and for better or worse,
exposure to the "modern" and
Western world. Out of sight, out of
mind.
Image 6.5: Wazir
Akbar Khan
(Google Earth)
Image 6.6:
Wazir Akbar
Khan (Peter
Ambs, Google
Earth)
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6.2 MANDAWI
Mandawi is
of the city
interviewee:
nestled
and as
in the middle
said by one
I love going to Kabul, and I want
to feel like I am in Kabul, so I go to
Mandawi, that is where the life of
the city is.
Simply put, Mandawi represents
Kabul and Afghanistan at its bare
bones. Its chaos, its agglomeration
of ethnicities, its pushcart vendors,
children running around between
adults chasing each other, a slew of
colors and spices. If Kabul is ever
romanticized as the exotic other,
Mandawi is what you would picture.
This was a similar point of view
echoed by many of the interviewees.
Mandawi does not offer people a
place to live, rather it is a marketplace
where residents of the city gather to
do their shopping and socialize with
each other. It is a wholesale market,
and business and vendors can be
found there at any point throughout
the day. The streets are narrow and
networked with each other, and
have miraculously escaped severe
destruction and bombing during
the Soviet, Mujahiddin, Taliban, and
American conflicts.
I used to go to Mandawi, it was
the place to go and the place to
Image 6.7: Marketplace in Kabul (Soupdumping, 2003)
see. Even if people did not need
anything, it was always busy.
Most of the wholesalers used to
go there and shop there, fashion,
everything.
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Mandawi is nestled in a nook of
the Kabul River in the center of the
city and surrounded by the heavy
traffic along Maiwand Road. The
marketplace is its main attraction.
Mandawi is not considered
modern, not a single respondent
mentioned it in his or her response,
but it is accessible for everyone
and is Afghanistan. The Masjid-e
Poli Khishti is on the outskirts of
Mandawi attracting a family crowd,
and especially busy during Friday
afternoon prayers. Mandawi is also
home to Lycee Aisha Durrani, a high
school for girls, allowing the female
presence to be noticed and felt in
the city in a manner that is not in all
neighborhoods.
I am always doing something.
Girls habits do not go and hang
out for nothing. We go to
Mandawi a lot, for buying stuff.
Though there is a park adjacent to
the high school, Park-e-Timur Shah,
it is a part of the Tomb of Timur
Shah making it not as frequented as
the Shahri Now Park. Mandawi
also exemplifies the type of urban
development that have been
identified as explicitly Afghan where
three types of retail spaces exist in
Mandawi. One type was a standard
shop, a dukan, another were the
pushcart vendors, dukan-e karachi,
and one of most explicit types of retail
were the dukan-e amwari, cabinet
shops (Calogero, 2011). These dukans
are present all throughout Mandawi
and exist just outside of the need for
building code enforcement and thus
do not need regulation.
There are people that are going
to business in Mandawi... these
are actually the areas for the
trades people, shopkeepers,
there are people that are pulling
those carts. People actually
prefer buying their stuff in
Mandawi because if you're doing
shopping once a week, it's better
to do it in Mandawi because it's
much cheaper. Mandawi is also
a wholesale market, so there are
peoplefrom otherparts of the city
that come buy their stuff once in
awhile because it's so traditional
still.
Shor Bazar, the neighborhood next
to Mandawi, is one of the poorest
places in Kabul, and houses many
of the older musicians of Kabul.
Known as Kochi Kharabat, in English
meaning Street of Destruction, the
musicians sit in their homes with their
instruments mourning and singing of
the days in Afghanistan where they
could sing. With the onslaught of
the Taliban music was banned, and
in recent years there has been an
emergence of newer westernized
musicians in efforts to appeal to
people beyond just the boundaries
of Kabul. Older musicians have
become obsolete. Sadly they reside
in this neighborhood, where you can
sometimes here remnants of song
when you pass by their homes.
Mandawi is located at the Char Rahi
Image 6.8: Gardens in Kabul, 1842 (Calogero)
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Sari Chawk, Char Rahi meaning,
intersection. This intersection
exemplifies the traffic problems of
Kabul.
Image 6.9 is an accurate depiction of
what a typical day might look like in
this intersection. This intersection is
particularly interesting because it is
the intersection through which the
neighborhoods of Hindu Guzar, Shor
Bazar, and Babay Khuda, some of the
poorest areas of the city gain direct
access to downtown, and access to
both the marketplace and areas of
Shahri Now. This intersection has
become a cross-section of worlds and
lives represented not only through
the paths it leads you to throughout
the city, but represented by the
various means of transportation in
the city, by foot, by car, by cart. All
are represented in this intersection.
It is feared that with the heavy
focus on transportation throughout
the city, one of the main changes
that might be proposed with the
implementation of the Third Master
Plan is a removal of the pushcart
vendors from this intersection as
their presence severely holds up
traffic. Because the major pushes
for the Third Master Plan have been
by the wealthier residents in the city,
and because these residents are the
ones with access to transportation
methods such as taxis and personal
cars. There is an inconvenience of
being stuck in traffic, in the midst
of Mandawi, where things are not
considered modern, beggars come
up to your door, and you cannot avoid
direct contact with parts of society
that one would otherwise disregard.
As one interviewee expressed :
It is horrible, it is the business
center of Kabul. All the trash
and good things are there.
Too crowded. Trash and good
things. Small narrow streets.
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It is almost unclear what the
interviewee describes as good
or bad. Mandawi just is. This is
Afghanistan. The good and the bad.
The crossroads between all a citizen
desires from a city, and all it wants
to simultaneously reject. Mandawi
displays Kabul's ineptitude to provide
a decent sanitation system for a
neighborhood that drives so much of
its commercial activity.
The greatest threat for this area is
the relocation or ban on the pushcart
vendors due to the traffic and fights
they may cause. There has been a
huge push to try and relocate the
Mandawi area, though I do not believe
this is in serious consideration for the
city. Still though, severe restrictions
and threats are constantly placed
upon Mandawi threatening those
whose livelihoods depend on this
area.
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6.3 MIKRORAYON 3
Mikrorayon is the perfect placefor
me. I still have all the necessities /
need. Also, if / need something, /
do not have to travel to Mandawi,
I just go to the marketplace of
Mikrorayon 3.
The Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan both pre- and post-
occupation resulted in a number of
Mikrorayons built. They were one
of the few places in Kabul that had
infrastructure provision and small
courtyards for community space
and playing, communal efforts that
were valued under the Soviet regime
and very well received by Afghans.
Image 6.11:
Mikrorayni 3
(Google Earth)
Initially all respondents indicated the
Mikrorayons were one of the spaces
that were most utilized by residents of
the city. Four Mikrorayons were built
in proximity to each other, but still in
different locations. It was necessary
to determine which of them emerged
as the most frequented. Though they
were similar in physical design, the
four had very different characteristics
that distinguished them from each
other. Mikrorayon 3 emerged as the
most utilized.
Mikrorayon 3 is different than the
other Mikrorayons because of its
marketplace strategically located on
Sarak Maydan Awayee, the major
and heavily renovated road that goes
from the center of the city to Kabul
International Airport. In addition
to having a market, Mikrorayon 3 is
more organized and developed than
Mikrorayon 2 or 4. Though similar
physically to Mikrorayon 1, it stands
out precisely because of this market
and its location to one of the city's
most widely used street.
Mikrorayon 3 has attracted a diverse
crowd for this very reason. Away
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from the hustle and the intensity
of the center of the city, it provides
both a space for leisurely shopping
and passing of time in the communal
courtyard. It is neither striving for
modernity today in the way Shahri
Now exemplifies, and it is neither
bogged down by the chaos of the
downtown city. Even those who
do not live in the Mikrorayons use
Mikrorayon 3's courtyard. If you
know some who lives in one of the
units, you are in.
People used to hang out in
Mikrorayon 3, it has a market,
a lot of people used to hang out
there. Kabul doesn't have any
good spaces, khaq (dirt) used to
go in your face. But people have
to live there. It's their country.
Good or bad, it's ours.
This interview resonated with me.
The interviewee switched between
using the third person and then the
first person the entire interview.
At first, he separated himself from
Mikrorayon, from the city, from the
country. Then he embraced the
country, the city, Mikrorayon as his
Image 6.12 Airport
Road (Unknown)
own. In many ways, this dichotomy
represents the multitude of feelings
and responsibilities Afghans feel in
their relationship with Afghanistan.
A striving for something beyond
national boundaries, yet sustenance,
pride, and an acceptance of even
khaq in the face.
Mikrorayon 3's popularity has
especially been heightened by the
development of the Sarak Maydan
Awayee during post American
occupation. What was previously
a dusty traffic-ridden road, is now
paved with much less traffic.
Mikrorayon 3 is located to the east
next to Qalai Zaman Khan, Simint
Khana and some other impoverished
informal neighborhoods. They
seem to be almost looming over
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the mikrorayons. The irony in
Simint Khana is that it means
"Cement House" because it used
to be a Cement Factory until it was
destroyed in the wars. Ironically,
cement represents permanence and
modernity because one who could
afford it and could stake their claim
in the land, was the one who was
more likely to live there and build
with cement. However, those who
currently inhabit the now destroyed
Simint Khana neighborhood, are
the very ones who can't afford to
purchase and utilize this material of
permanence. Their homes are made
of mud, as seemingly unstable as
their livelihoods in the city.
With current plan implementations,
it is not clear what will happen to
Mikrorayon 3. Though the regions
next to Mickorayon 3 are poor, they
are still pretty formal, meaning
that the city may not completely
displace the residents to upgrade
the neighborhood. However,
directly across the Airport Road,
the neighborhood of Bibi Mahru, is
also located along the Airport Road.
There is a stark contrast between
this neighborhood of Bibi Mahru and
its surrounding areas, almost as if it
is out of place. Expats and visitors
often visit Bib Mahru Hill because
of the Mughal history attached to
the area, and its proximity to Wazir
Akbar Khan makes the neighborhood
safer than it commonly would be in
other areas. An abandoned pool, a
symbol of abandoned promises is at
the top of Bibi Mahru Hill where kids
currently play.
With plan implementation, the
strategic location of Bibi Mahru
along Airport road, and adjacent to
the wealthy neighborhood of Wazir
Akbar Khan, the neighborhood is in
serious danger of being revitalized.
This will directly effect the
neighborhoods of the Mikrorayons
and specifically Mikrorayon 3. A
great number of interviewees from
informal spaces in Kabul located
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Image 6.14: Qazi
Building (Salimi,
2011)
near Mikrorayon 3 indicated that
this was a place that they utilized as
public space to both meet others,
have picnics, and that it was either
too expensive or time consuming to
go downtown or to the marketplace.
The process of development along
Airport Road is going to marginalize
and gentrify populations in this area,
and though the Mikrorayons will not
be completely affected because they
still have infrastructure that most of
the city does not, most surrounding
areas along Airport Road will be.
This has greater implications on
the marketplace either threatening
its actual existence as those with
money can perhaps afford to shop in
Shahri Now, or severely reduce foot
traffic in the area as is supported
by the physically expansive and
wide Airport Road. As is already
being seen by the development of
Qazi Building slight development is
already occurring in the area of Bibi
Mahru and Mikrorayon, threatening
the livelihood and permanence of
those who live in this housing.
The stark contrast of the seemingly
permanent buildings and the mud
homes in the area is a looming
threat to the neighborhoods that
fear their future in the city of
Kabul. With further development
along Airport Road, Mikrorayon
3 will be severely threatened. As
traffic is further accommodated
along this street, there will be less
people walking around because this
particular section of the city is not
as pedestrian friendly as others are.
This will detract people from visiting
the courtyard from the various parts
of the city or coming for Mikrorayon
3's marketplace.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
PLANNING IMPLICATIONS
7.1 INFORMALITY AND LAND RIGHTS
Given the complexity of all that is occurring in Kabul, there are a myriad of implications
for planning both as a profession and as a field of study. One of these issues is the
question of land tenure. In Kabul, the informal population comprises 80% of the
population, posing the question of how informality is actually defined. And, as
indicated, informality is not defined in the most typical sense. Informality in Kabul is
not synonymous with poor or slums or settlement, even though this may be the case
in many instances. Rather, informality in Kabul is defined as those settlements that do
not have their propertytitles recorded in the CityTitle office, and Kabul has a numberof
these informal settlement patterns that with any other definition would be considered
formal. In some confidential documents the definition of informality that emerged
were "settlements which are built after 1978 without compliance to the Third Master
Plan and Detail Plans" (Anyone, 2012). In initial interviews and conversations about
the topic of informality, I struggled to define what it meant in the context of Kabul to
the people I spoke to. I defined it as squatter settlements, and foolishly referenced
squatter settlements in India, as many people from Afghanistan had visited India. My
definition did not resonate, nor did it address any of the questions I had.
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Me: Is Simint Khana considered
poor?
Interviewee: Yes it is poor. You
are looking for poor and rich
areas? The only place which is
rich in Kabul that is Share Naw
and Wazir Akbar Khan. The rest
of Kabul is poor.
Me: But is it formal or informal?
Do they own the property? Or
did they just show up there? Like
those places in India you referred
to?
Interviewee: Most of the places
people own the property inside
Kabul. But then don't pass the
design by the municipality. They
make it by themselves.
Me: But like Kohi Asmayi, it's
informal. They just go there, it's
not in their name in the city right?
Interviewee: Yeah, the mountain
houses they are all informal.
Me: What about Simint Khana?
And Qalai Zaman Khan?
Interviewee: They are poor to
middle areas.
Me: And do the people who live
there own it?
Interviewee: They do own it.
It is not land or property like
other parts of Kabul. These are
places where the houses existed
and people came and build it or
renewed it again.
Me: I'm not sure I understand. So
they're formal? Not informal?
Interviewee: What do you mean
by formal or informal?
These initial interviews were
particularly challenging because the
concept of informality was not fully
understood as I initially partook in
my research. Many people stake
land and space on land that is either
not owned or have absentee owners.
However, these people are not
always poor squatters, as they are in
Kohi Asmayi.
The image above is a settlement
pattern identified by Calogero. The
bottom of the image from the left
to the right is Kabul University and
the formal region of Jemal Mena.
However, north of this area is an
informal area that was laid out
under the development control of
an army general. In this case, the
informal pattern follows and mimics
the formal pattern, indicating that
informality does not necessarily
inhabit the qualities that are typically
associated with it.
As Caloge ro discovered in his research,
some of the informal population
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are very well connected individuals
who have hired people for the
construction of their homes on this
land. Their political and familial ties
with police officers protect them from
being uprooted. This exceptionalism
has allowed this population to
supersede legality in a manner that
is beneficial to those who might have
control over these developments.
Various individuals that have
administrative and governmental
power intentionally deny the
legality of these developments while
limiting legal development for the
very purpose that they may extract
various privileges, favors, I.O.U.s in
the future.
Calogero recounts a story:
A commander had built his
house so that it projected well
out into an existing roadway,
blocking half of it. AbdulRashid
Janbaz, the Economic Planning
Director of Kabul in 2002-2004
accompanied the police chief to
the site, to notify the commander
that he would have to demolish
the projecting part of it house,
or have it demolished by the
city. The police chief suddenly
recognized the commander as a
fellow mujahid; they had fought
alongside each other against the
Soviets in the 1980s. The police
chief was then unwilling to insist
that the commander demolish
the projecting part of his house...
this was an act of exception for
the sake of loyalty. (Calogero,
2011)
These acts of exceptionalism pose
greater threats and consequences
to returning refugees who do not
have the social, familial, or political
ties that allow them the conditional
permanence to stake space on land.
5 million refugees have returned to
their homes since 2002, and over 3
million are still in Iran and Pakistan
and may still return from these places.
Though these acts of exceptionalism
are occurring throughout the city,
the majority of the informal residents
in Kabul are renters. They pay rent
to farmers whose land it once
was, and this land is customarily
recognized, and subject to the pricing
of the housing market, which is at
the moment almost comparable to
the price of housing in San Francisco.
Their rights are being constantly
negotiated, and they do not have the
ties that might allow them to remain
and keep their homes.
On the other hand are the land-
tenure rights granted to those who
have been forced to flee Afghanistan.
While visions of the Taliban have
normally been attributed to
destruction of the city, and rightfully
so, when they secured Kabul in
1996, they asked for the expatriate
Afghans to come back to the country
and claim their property and spend
money, as a means of economically
revitalizing the city. The irony lies
in that they protected property
rights and relations in a way that
made it susceptible to market forces
in order to generate an adequate
and sustainable recovery. At this
point, however, many expatriate
Afghans have claimed their homes,
particularly well-to-do ones in Wazir
Akbar Khan and rent them out at
exorbitant prices fit for a city like San
Francisco. (Calogero, 2011)
This brings to mind questions of
rights of access to the city; what
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does it mean for planning when the
people who formally own land in a
city, a minority of the population, are
not physically there? What does it
mean for the city that the majority
of the population who is physically
in Kabul is considered informal and
exists in a state of limbo with their
habitation constantly negotiated
and renegotiated? Are efforts to
implement the Third Master Plan, or
any subsequent plans stalled in order
to capitalize on the favors presented
by the urban elite to those with
administrative power to formally
decide how space is allocated? Do
formal public spaces like the ones
discussed in the previous chapter
favor informality, regardless of the
favoritism that occurs throughout
the city, because it does not threaten
their existence? Finally, how does
one plan for an integration of these
spaces in the face of exceptionalist
informality, fragmented governance,
and a number of nonexistent formal
landowners?
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7.2 LACK OF DATA AND INFORMATION
Another issue that affects methods
of planning in the city, among many
other things, is the lack of salient
data made publicly available. This
brings to light obvious question
of accessibility and rights to
information. However, further
consequences are reverberated,
such as how planning occurs in the
absence of maps. Planning indicates
intentionality, regardless of formality
and informality such as in the context
of Kabul. The fact that this planning
is still occurring without data or
maps, makes one question who is
actually being planned for. If informal
residents are not properly accounted
for by the City, or any agency,
how can policies be made that
accurately project for this segment
of the population? This is not to
advocate for the transformation of
people into numbers, rather a better
understanding of the variations in
the population.
This is also not to say that no progress
is being made on this issue. There are
a variety of studies being conducted
and demographic information
collected, but its accessibility is
murky; one can only obtain such
highly classified documents if working
with either a multilateral agency
with such a clearance to obtain
this data or within the segment of
government that may provide one
with this information, or simply
this information may be provided
to you if you know somebody with
the access to it. This paper is not
meant to undermine sufficient
research done by agencies such as
the World Bank, UN-Habitat, or even
Afghan domestic agencies. Rather,
it is drawing attention to the lack
of salient neighborhood level data
encompassing all relevant informal
and formal information by an agency
without intentions of altering the
shape of the city in favor of a more
Western city, catered to the transient
elite population moving into and
out of the city as their perceptions
of safety continuously evolve. It
is advised that this transfer of
knowledge be made available through
the public disposal of this information
so that interested parties, NGOs,
even international observers can
be made aware of who the Afghan
people are. The Afghan people, not
just the woman in the blue burka,
or the Talib, or Karzai's brother who
owns the Afghan restaurant down
in Kendall Square, or the child flying
the kite, or the young bride. But the
man who lives in Andarabi and has
a dokan in Mandawi, or the student
at Kabul Polytechnic University
who believes planning to mean
designing orthogonal streets, or the
girl who utilizes graffiti as a means
of expression throughout the city, or
just simply, the Afghan person. It is
when conceptions of the Other are
set aside that we can begin seeing
people as humans, and we can begin
seeing people as humans once we
begin to know them. And we know
them, when we have information
about them. Raw information that
has not been transferred through the
filters of the various intentions that
shroud the city.
In my initial request with a
responding of 200 people, for those
who wrote to me through email,
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I received an attachment of the
map from Afghanistan Information
Management Services of Kabul
along with many of the responses.
It indicated to me that there is a
desire to know; that this map is one
of the very few publicly available
and accessible map (even though it
was produced in 2005), and the fact
that so many Afghans knew of its
existence, knew where to find it, and
that it was relevant to my research
indicated that what information does
exist does not go overlooked, but is
sought out and circulated among the
community. Though I hadcomeacross
the map two years prior, I thanked
each individual for this information
and found it incredibly endearing.
It was fascinating the amount of
knowledge people had of what was
made available; to make it seem that
Afghans are unwilling participants of
their own city is a gross undermining
of the reality of the situation. The
Afghan community I interacted with
were willing participants of their own
fate. The fact that Afghanistan has
been political unstable for so many
years can be testament to the fact
that the Afghan population will not
withstand oppression, colonialism,
and mistreatment in general. Many
of them were very well aware of
situations around the city and how
neighborhoods were formed:
In Khair Khana, these people
brought their own architects,
made their own places, they
made their own city because they
needed to. Mini cities. Warlords,
commanders bought the land
from people and government,
and the city, the shar wali, is
saying we didn't approve it.
Another interviewee said regarding
the lack of data:
Regarding the lack of data/
mapping: I emailed you that
map last time and it was the
first one like that which I've
ever seen, ever. Not having
access to basic mapping and
demographic information
prevents the emergence of
localized business. There's
really no way for commerce
to take shape if the necessary
data/information isn't
available for entrepreneurs
to access. Lastly, I think true
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demographic information in
Kabulis currentstate is difficult
to amass because there was
and is such an influx of people
from the rural provinces that
until things start to stabilize
and folks situate themselves
the powers that be can't/
won't embark on any effort to
truly take a census or account
of who is where.
Another:
I would like the data to be
available because it will help
to make any decision for the
city and surrounding area.
Decision such as number and
location of hospitals, schools,
parking spaces and other
organization and facilities.
It is very crucial as much as
other data are for any city or
county.
There is an issue of the lack of salient
data and planning in the absence of
maps, and the concept of unmapping
as indicated in earlier chapters;
it is convenient not to have any
accountability to a people you do
not map. The lack of information
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made public also means the lack of
people holding you accountable for
the stipulations a government, or
any other entity, has said they would
provide. Beyond accountability and
planning implications, however,
there is the issue of intentionally
keeping a public in the dark about
themselves, and seeing that public as
not deserving of knowing.
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7.3 FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
The three public spaces that
emerged through my interviews had
their own particular characteristics.
Upon further research of these
spaces and information that was
made available by the Third Master
Plan and subsequent revisions of it,
combined with predictions of future
development based upon a trajectory
that Kabul isfollowing atthe moment,
it was also made apparent that other
spaces throughout the city were at
a risk, as well. Informal housing and
neighborhoods, not necessarily the
ones who housed those with political
connections, but those who housed
refugees, squatters, and the poor of
the city are at an obvious risk. Kabul
is located on a fault line and the
settlements in the hills are at a greater
risk in situations of emergency.
Potential future development would
assumingly address the housing that
would be most affected by natural
disasters such as these earthquakes
and the flooding of the Kabul River.
In situations
Municipality
where the Kabul
considers instilling
an Urban Growth Boundary, the
outskirts of the city may be most
affected. In addition, future urban
development and the focus on roads
have the potential of turning various
parts of the city into ethnic enclaves.
Though the center of the city is more
ethnically diverse, the outskirts still
maintain majorities of one ethnic
population or another and without
considerable attention paid to
integrating these communities into
the city, ethnic tensions may be
reinforced. This is not to posit that
conflict in Kabul is an ethnic conflict,
as many problems are attributed
to, but that as the goals for any city
are, the promotion of exposure to
various backgrounds are of great
importance. This is why this issue of
public space in these regions are of
commanding interest; people from
the various sections of the city, from
different ethnicities, come together
in these spaces and interact in a
way that they may not in their given
neighborhoods. Simply said, roads
do not necessarily mean integration,
they also form physical boundaries.
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7.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR INVOLVEMENT
As indicated earlier, the First Master
Plan was prepared and written in
1964 by what are referred to as
Afghan "experts with the support of
advisors from the USSR." The Second
Master Plan in 1970 was made with
heavier influence and assistance
by the USSR and UNESCO (United
Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization). Finally, the
Third Master Plan was made in
1976 with further involvement and
influence by the Soviets. A major
component that is missing is public
participation in the formulation
of any of these plans, in addition
to current ideas for plans that are
being circulated. Not only is the
withholding of information from the
public a major problem, but so is the
complete lack of their involvement
in the process of gathering this
information and making decisions
and planning policies based upon
them. This lack of involvement
can imply that Afghanistan is not
a communal culture and that
community engagement is not a
desired attribute. This could not be
further from the truth. Experiences
recounted by various interviewees
in addition to personal experience
and narratives derived from family,
relatives, and friends, have always and
traditionally referred to the various
communal activities and decisions
that have been made. Communal
culture is definitely a tradition and
a persistent part of rural Afghan
culture today, and decisions are
made with elders and with the input
of the entire community. Though the
tradition specific to the rural culture
of Afghanistan carries some of its own
challenges, it still displays the major
role it plays in not only development,
but also any of the various decisions
that are made. The disregard for
community involvement historically
and currently in the development of
the city parallels the withholding of
information from them, and shows
how the planner embodies visions
of the technocrat, instilling policies
and imparting information on the
"ignorant" population. Visions of the
subaltern are not only propagated in
the West upon Afghans, but within
the Afghan hierarchal system as well.
Those who are informally involved
in any sort of plan for the future of
Kabul are commonly the urban elite.
The taxi drivers because circulation
is of great importance to the plan
implementers and the wealthy who
can afford to take these taxis to get
around the city. Other groups that
are involved are Afghans who have
been educated in the West and come
back to influence policy and planning
decisions (I can include myself in
this population, unfortunately. It is
a dialogue I am privileged to have in
a manner that is not available to the
very people that these policies affect)
Even help from Western agencies
itself is actively sought and desired as
it indicates conditions of modernity,
and of knowing better. Further
engagement of the public must be
actively sought for the stability and
sustenance of any future plans of
development. Their knowledge must
not be undermined.
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7.5 SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Through this research it has been
made increasingly clear that though
there are various places throughout
the city that have not been physically
planned for public space, residents
of the city are more inclined to be
involved in spaces and areas that
bring people of various income
groups together from a diverse
ethnic background. Though it is true
that people do spend time in their
own homes and their own backyards,
there are various spaces throughout
the city that draw a greater crowd
in while supporting and maintaining
the livelihoods of the individuals that
take part in that aspect of the city.
The Third Master Plan, what little is
known about it, does not necessarily
accommodate the three major spaces
that I have identified as a popular and
of paramount importance for public
space gathering. Therefore, the
following are recommendations that
might be taken into consideration in
order to accommodate these spaces
and the people who utilize them.
Acknowledging that these may be
limited in scope as the major issue
in Kabul transcends beyond just
streetscape improvements, there is
a role for design interventions that
may mitigate some of the immediate
effects of development in Kabul.
Shahri Now
Shahri Now is what most people
in Kabul consider modernity. As
interviews indicated, along with mere
physical visualization of its buildings,
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upkeep and general infrastructure,
it is the most modern section of the
city. The fear is that the city is going
to begin formalizing surrounding
neighborhoods, particularly Kohi
Asmayi in addition to areas just south
of Shahri Now.
If a street or overpass was built from
this area directly towards the areas
of Shari Now, greater accessibility
might be provided for those in this
region, allowing a greater flow into
the neighborhood instead of having
it completely exclusive.
As it currently stands, Salaang Road
is a major divisive barrier between
the southern part and Shahri Now.
The buildings along that road are
not human scale, providing an
actual physical barrier as well. An
integration of some road from the
Qoli Abachakn region and Shahri Now
might provide better flow, however a
car road is not suggested. Those who
live in this poorer region of Kabul do
not necessarily own vehicles, nor are
the mountains and hills in a state that
a car can drive upon. Therefore, a
pedestrian walkway is recommended.
In addition, storefront improvement
to the spaces along Salaang Road
so that it is welcoming and not
exclusive may help retain some of
the various residents of the street.
Building another passageway in this
region may ease traffic backed up
in Mandawi, and allow greater flow
throughout Shahri Now. This may
also prevent a backup of traffic for
visitors who wish to see the infamous
Chicken Street. See Image 7.2 for a
picture of Chicken Street.
However, I do not suggest nor
recommend a complete halt to
"modernity" in this section of Kabul.
It is perhaps the only section of Kabul
where residents come across what is
typically associated with the West.
The Municipal government's ability
and desire to emulate the West in
this manner in the face of concerned
planners who attempt to come in
and stop them in the name of "good
planning," shows the government's
sovereignty over their own land. It
is my own selfish identity of being
Afghan that wants to preserve
everything that I consider Afghan,
however, if this space has emerged
as the most populated, there is
something about this connection to
an outside world that has perhaps
allowed Afghans to persist in their
daily lives.
Formalization of property is also a
major issue and the greatest threat
to Shahri Now being used as a public
space of gathering for those in the
city. As indicated earlier in this
chapter, informality and land rights
are particularly shaky when it comes
to poorer and refugee populations
who fit these typical definitions of
informality. While some informal
settlements may not be particularly
threatened in the immediate future
because of their social, political,
and financial ties to the elite who
influence who can or cannot stay
on the land, those without these
connections are in danger. There
may be plans to formalize these
neighborhoods, or move residents
out of Kohi Asmayi because of the
seismic danger this region presents
to their homes. At the same time,
these particular areas are in danger
because of their proximity to the city
center and the lucrative development
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opportunities that may eventually
present themselves, which may be
the point at which the city stalls any
discussion of land rights, tenure,
and space within the city. Plans
of preserving and upgrading the
cemetery at Qoli Abchakan is an
additional concern; graveyards are
contributing to conflict in various
communities as there is a shortage
of land made available for these
spaces throughout the entire city.
Informal areas around this cemetery
may be cleared out in accordance
to a grid or a formal plan in order
to make more land available for the
cemetery. It is not just lucrative
development that threatens the
surrounding areas of Shahri Now, but
also land use allocations aside from
public space and residential space.
In considering demands of the cities
and maintaining a holistic vision of
requirements of municipalities, it is
apparent that Kabulis demand just
as much from their own cities than
any other citizenry demands of their
own.
Mandawi
The major obstacle in Mandawi is the
traffic. Given the excessive amount
of traffic, the municipality may push
car hierarchy in this area to allow for
better access to the city center. In
doing so, pushcart vendors, a major
component of retail in this area may
become banned all together around
this area. A car hierarchy will affect
not only the pushcart vendors in
this region, but may potentially
affect pedestrian traffic, which is
a major bearer of business for the
marketplaces of Mandawi.
In considering potential solutions,
Calogero suggests the following:
A number of wealthy Afghans were
complaining that the pushcart
vendors should be banned altogether,
blaming them for the severe traffic
congestion in the center of the city. /
argued that one of the advantages of
this regulation was to clarify where
pushcart-vendors had a protected
right to operate, rather than suffer
sporadic police harassment and the
need to pay bribes. (Calogero, 2011)
To have designated sections for
these pushcart vendors would help
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ease traffic in the city in addition to
protecting the livelihood of those
running these carts. Having various
channels and thoroughways for
pedestrians in these areas, with
further availability for shops in these
regions, may ease traffics in the
streets. Of greater consideration
may be to construct a separate
pedestrian bridge adjacent to where
the current bridge is connected to
the city center. This attention to a
means of connecting Mandawi to
the city center for pedestrians can
encourage more leisurely activity
around the Kabul River. The Kabul
River did emerge as one of the more
frequented spaces in Kabul. It is a
river that runs throughout the city,
but primarily utilized by males. To
incorporate some level of activity
around the River that both men and
women can use, may bring greater
utility to the women of the city,
particularly given the location of
Lycee Aisha Durrani to Mandawi and
the River.
Another consideration that may
be given to easing some of the
traffic spaces so that Mandawi can
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preserve the unique character that
makes it popular to so many Afghans
today, would be bicycle accessibility.
Encouraging biking around this
region would not only reduce traffic
and pollution, but also aid health
problems and a better quality of
living in many ways. Bicycles and
sustainability has typically been a
middle-class conversation; those
who are typically left on the fringes
of society should not bear the
burdens of the lifestyle of those with
the most amount of consumption.
This fact contributed to my hesitation
in proposing bikes throughout
the city as a better method of
transportation for those who could
access it. A planning implication and
ultimate recommendation may be
to encourage people to get around
on bikes instead of just by foot or
car. Those who elect to navigate
through the city by car may continue
to do so, but perhaps those who are
currently navigating by foot may find
it more convenient and easier to go
through the city by bicycle. In this
way, road improvements may help
this segment of the population as
well, instead of isolating pedestrians
completely. Given the current social
climate in Afghanistan today, I found
that riding bicycles is a method of
transportation primarily utilized
by men. However, prior to the
Taliban and Mujahideen era, several
interviewees recounted the time
when women rode their bikes in the
city, though acknowledging not as
often as men.
They seldom rode bikes. Only
in areas like Sharay Naw,
Kartay char, mecrowrayan in
our time. Now probably not
at all.
I hesitate to encourage this as a
major means of reducing traffic. All
too often policies are formulated
and implemented for the good of the
society, and many times minorities or
women are made to bear the burden
of this contribution. This policy
recommendation has the potential to
exclude women who do not typically
ride bikes whether due to comfort,
clothing, or a myriad of other reasons.
I acknowledge that as a whole,
promoting bicycle accessibility may
help ease some of the bad traffic
situations and problems that may
arise from development in the area.
The direction of future development
in Kabul should encourage bicycle
accessibility, however there are
societal instabilities that discourage
me from the outright promotion of
this. Policy implementation in spaces
like Kabul are often a patriarchal
dialogue, and though I am attune
to the cultural sensitivities in these
cities, I hesitate to perpetuate this
dialogue to solve a traffic and design
problem. However, when women
begin riding bicycles through the city
when they have achieved their level of
comfort in doing so, I wholeheartedly
suggest and encourage greater
bicycle accessibility in the city.
Accommodating appropriately
for gender dynamics in cities that
may be sensitive to them also have
major planning implications and can
potentially be especially complex as
an outsider attempting to influence
city interventions and suggestions.
Mikrorayon 3
The Mikrorayons are strategically
located on Airport Road. This
strategic location not only means
that there is a potential to gentrify
the area, but also decrease foot
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traffic as it becomes less pedestrian
friendly and caters more to cars,
making Mikrorayon 3 less successful
as a marketplace and a space for
public gathering. Of greater concern
is Bibi Mahru Hill, which is already an
attraction for expatriates and visitors
from all around the country. If Bibi
Mahru Hill incorporates a museum
or site, as it already is an ancient
neighborhood, foot traffic will be
maintained even if land around the
Mikrorayons becomes formalized.
A bigger sidewalk on both ends of
Airport Road would make the region
pedestrian friendly. In addition,
providing a means of crossing the
expansive road by foot or bicycle
so that easily people can get to and
from the various neighborhoods
on either side of the street, may
help mitigate any potential damage
from development. Traffic has
eased a great deal in this region. If
Mikrorayon 3 maintains its position
as a shopping area and public space
that is less chaotic than Mandawi,
then further steps can in fact be taken
to redirect severe traffic or chaos
away from Mandawi. If Mikrorayon
3 becomes difficult to access or
becomes abandoned all together,
then Mandawi will increase in traffic
as families direct their shopping and
leisure activities towards this section,
amplifying current traffic problems.
Given these recommendations, I am
not saying that the Planning Office
is incompetent and that they are
not considering the various factors
when implementing the plan. What
I am saying is that formalization and
modernization is not necessarily the
way to go when 80% of your entire
city is considered informal. Are we
solely planning and accommodating
for the remaining 20%, most of
which do not permanently reside in
Kabul? I suggest that the plan be
made available and public, so that
suggestions from various agencies
and individuals can be made who
have the interest of the Afghan
people at heart.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
Through the various interviews and mapping exercises, three spaces emerged as the
most frequented in all of Kabul, Shahri Now, Mandawi, and Mikrorayon. Though these
spaces are very distinct in character and composition, they all have their livelihood
threatened by components of the Third Master Plan in addition to proposed future
development of Kabul. The preservation of these spaces is vital as the Afghan citizens
who utilize these spaces are varied with regards to income and ethnicity among many
other variables. These spaces provide a means of exposure and interaction amongst
residents that may not necessarily be nurtured in neighborhood dynamics.
Though plans for development will not be completely abandoned as it represents
security and modernity, there are a variety of strategies that can be implemented that
may preserve these spaces or mitigate the effects of development. These include
physical interventions as well as addressing broader planning implications that these
spaces demand. While physical interventions do emerge from Western dialogues
of city design and development, taking into consideration broader planning issues
specific to the space of Kabul may contribute to the cultural sensitivity demanded in
the planning for, or study of, these spaces in Kabul.
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Image 10.1: Kids playing in Mikrorayon (Cospaa via Google Earth)
Throughout the course of Afghan
history, it is apparent that Afghans
have had a long struggle for what
it means to be modern. This was
evidenced in King Amanullah's efforts
of designing Kabul in a beaux-arts
manner and maintaining a European
dresscode in the public spaces of
Kabul during the 1920s. Kabul Jadid,
his 1923 plan for Afghanistan was
evidence of the physical manner in
which he attempted to maintain order
through spatial transformations of
the city.
The regimes of power following
Amanullah from Nader Shah to the
rise and demise of the Soviet empire
in Afghanistan witnessed subsequent
attempts at modernization. However,
what is most important to consider
is that the struggle for and attempt
at modernization is not, and has
not been the sole narrative of the
city. There are myraid of struggles
against systemic pressures present
in Kabul. While the West defines its
modernity in the subaltern nature
of the Other, they are working to
instill Western logistics and a method
of living into a system and country
that is rejecting it. While many
Afghans and Westerns may seem to
embrace the Western logistics as a
means of ruling Afghanistan, they
are confronted with an underlying
system in Afghanistan that does not
align with these attempts. Taking
the example of land-tenure and
formalization in the face of family ties,
loyalties, and political connections,
attempts at formalziation and order
are rejected when the Officer refuses
to remove the man whose home
is violating city codes based upon
loyalties. Is Afghanistan reinforcing
its anti-modernity at each attempt
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at instilling systems of modernity,
formality, and order?
Can planning influence these socially
embedded ties and institutions in
a manner that is incorporating the
voice of communities, the informal
populations that constitute the
majority of Kabul? The exportation
of ideas and practices as though it
is a commodity is repeatedly failing
in other countries as evidenced
by the lack of political stability in
the American instilled government
in Kabul and land tenure issues
throughout the city.
In turn, the West propagates this
dialogue towards modernity and
struggle. Ironically, Afghans "inter-
reference" modernity in Asia + The
middle East and the not the West
as these spaces are visually and
physically accessibile to them. This
is an interesting turn of events and
threatens Western superiority. In
contrast, Afghans see the West as
being subaltern to cities like Dubai
and East Asia.
Finally, there is an immediate need
to change the rhetoric surrounding
"subaltern" spaces in the implicit
dialogue of planning. These spaces,
and the residents who inhabit
these spaces, are active and willing
participants of their own city.
100

STAKING SPACE PLANNING, PUBLIC SPACE, AND VISIONS OF THE SUBALTERN
1. Afghanistan Information Management Services. (2005, February). Kabul Map. Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. Afghanistan, I. E. (2000). Municipal Law of Afghanistan. Kabul.
3. Ahmadi, S. W. (2006). History and Culture of Afghanistan. Berkeley.
4. Arez, G., & Dittman, A. (2005). Kabul: Aspects of Urban Geography. Peshawar, Pakistan: Self-Published.
5. Bayat, A. (2000). From 'Dangerous Classes' to 'Quiet Rebels': Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South. Internation
al Sociology.
6. Calogero, P. (2011). Planning Kabul: The Politics of Urbanization in Afghanistan.
7. Cloud, D. (2005, March 3). Rebuilding Afghanistan: Reprising his Role as Mayor, Noorzad has Big Plans. Wall Street Journal, p.
Al.
8. Corbusier, L. (1927). Towards a New Architecture. New York: Payson & Clarke, Ltd.
9. Davis, M. (2006). Planet of Slums. London; New York: Verso.
10. de Certeau, M. (1984). The Prace of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press.
11. de Soto, H. a. (1989). The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper & Row.
12. flickr, s. v. (2003, August 21). Kabul: Flickr.
13. Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power. In H. L. Dreyfus, & P. Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (pp. 208-
226). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
14. Foucault, M. (1983). The Subject and the Power. In H. Dreyfus, & P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics (pp. 208-226). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
15. French, R. A. (1994). Plans, Pragmatism and People: The Legacy of Soviet Planning for Today's Cities. Pittsburgh, PA: University
of Pittsburgh Press.
16. Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (2001). Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities, and the Urban
Condition. New York: Routledge.
17. Gregorian, V. (1969). The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
18. Harvey, D. (1987). Flexible Accumulation through Urbanization: Reflections on 'Post-Modernism' in the American City.". Anti
pode, 19 (13), 260-286.
19. Howard, E. (1902). Garden Cities of To-Morrow (Being the Second Edition of "To-Morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform").
London: S. Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.
20. Kinzer, S. (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
21. Krogius, V. The Management of Town Planning Processes in the USSR. In P. Whitehead, Soviet Planning in the 1980s: A Collec
tion of Original Planning Papers from the Soviet Union. How & Blackhall.
102
Bibliography
22. Lefebvre, H. (2008). Critique of Everyday Life. London: Verso.
23. Lefebvre, H. (1968). The Right to the City. In Writings on Cities (pp. 63-181). Cambridge, MA: BLackwell.
24. Mitchell, T. (1988). Colonising Egypt. New York: Cambridge University Press.
25. Moore, J. (n.d.). Afghanistan Photos. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from National Geographic: http://travel.nationalgeographic.
com/travel/countries/afghanistan-photos/#/afghanistan-hotel_2137_600x450.jpg
26. Mouffe, C. (2005). The Return of the Political. London: Verso.
27. Nemat, A. K. (1976). A Strategy for Restructuring of the Central Business District of Kabul. New Delhi: School of Planning and
Architecture.
28. Nickelsberg, R. (n.d.). Afghanistan Photos. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from National Geographic: http://travel.nationalgeograph
ic.com/travel/countries/afghanistan-photos/#/afghanistan-laborers_2139_600x450.jpg
29. Ong, A., & Roy, A. (2011). Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global. Chichester, West Sussex; Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
30. Ouse, S. (n.d.). Chicken Street Carpet Store. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from http://www.stanouse.com/images%20Afghan/
In%20KABUL/Chicken%2OStreet/pages/542%2OChicke n%20Street%2OCarpet%2OStore.html
31. Perlman, J. (2004). Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro. In A. Roy, & N. Alsayyad, Urban Infor
mality.
32. Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
33. Roy, A. (2003). City Requiem, Calcutta: Gender and the Politics of Poverty. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota
Press.
34. Sadeq, M. (2012, March 20). Afghanistan: March 2012. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from The Big Picture:
35 Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books.
36. Saint-Exupery, A. d. (1943). The Little Prince. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock.
37. Salimi, K. (2011, April). Qazi Buliding Makrorayon 3 Market. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from Panoramio: http://www.panora
mio.com/photo/51764838
38. Shah, I. A. (1939). Modern Afghanistan. London: S. Low, Marston & Co.
39. Sherwood, R. (1978). Modern Housing Prototypes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
40. Sobhani, 0. (2012, March 15). Afghanistan: March 2012 . Retrieved May 24, 2012, from The Big Picture: http://www.boston.
com/bigpicture/2012/04/afghanistanmarch_2012.html
41. Unknown. (n.d.). Afghanistan in Photos. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from Facebook.com: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php
?fbid=363004307068420&set=a.318574114844773.68266.318572588178259&type=3&theater
103
STAKING SPACE PLANNING, PUBLIC SPACE, AND VISIONS OF THE SUBALTERN
42. Wenger, A. (2006). Darul Aman Palace Kabul. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:Darul_aman_palace kabul_2006-02.JPG
43. Wild, R. (1982). Amanullah: Ex-King of Afghanistan. Quetta: Nisa Traders.
44. Zhangchang0220. (n.d.). Kabul Market. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from Dotting: http://www.dotting.me/en/photo-7416.html
45. Vidiani. (n.d.). Detailed administrative and Road Map of Afghanistan. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from Vidiani: http://www.
vidiani.com/?p=3050
Additional Photo Credits
Cover Page: Moore, J. (n.d.). Afghanistan Photos. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from National Geographic: http://travel.nationalgeograph-
ic.com/travel/countries/afghanistan-photos/#/afghanista n-hotel_2137_600x450.jpg
Acknowledgements Page: Sadeq, M. (2012, March 20). Afghanistan: March 2012. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from The Big Picture:
Cover Page Chapter 2: Sobhani, 0. (2012, March 15). Afghanistan: March 2012 . Retrieved May 24, 2012, from The Big Picture:
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2012/04/afghanistanmarch_2012.html
104

STAKING SPACE PLANNING, PUBLIC SPACE, AND VISIONS OF THE SUBALTERN
0 (S AZ. 7 BE
hu ne s
BUX0r ~ aiy-Tz
Sam and
UZF KI TA AyniTfeama I A
T U R M E NI S - N ush JI IKI STA N U
caemyrd t KUlob Taxhorgan
Teje 00 eppa
Keleft Feywbad
r-e K Es hem (LashtM a f hhad asahsbega n - hot ,., oz TAM AU S
R1 -AN seym, PD - <*(samangan saghli
- -oke Khomif G1lglt
FARY4B - ,..!SAMvANGAl4 ChNiti
s \ .. SAR-E POL 
- .r -NRESTAN-
Gareh-ye Now .. MA
ert ' ,.-- - aghcharan - oK ONAR
H E R A T GH WR abinaga
-.... slam a
idand OUG-d 
0
Gin -
anT -a HEM D KNDU
P arnA6 Aghnsa
3 G host----- 
Inernaiona boudar
Zekk eh-- 
- - rvne vlyt)budr
Naonl apta
Prvic (klyt aia
mRoa
-y N saraSTA fgaisa
Mashke 0S Ine00 io a 200 uK d r
ap f fg anst nVdi andi ~R ~~^^~'^^~d
1060 P0 a
Appendices
KABUL CITY MAP
LEGEND
BOUNDARY
District
Contours
461a.rLkws
ROADS
.,A Dided Boulevard
Secondary
- Brdge
DRAINAGE
Lake
River
URBAN LAND USE
Bult up Aram
Cultivated Area
Park
Cornetery
PLACE OF INTEREST
+ Airport
4 Bar*
a Historical Site
- Historical Wall
[IJ Hospital
eHotel
aS Mosque
asPalace
- Poke Staon
M Post Ofice
M Restaurant
* Scool
=>Stadlumn
UniversaltCoege
ANNOTATION
District Number
-um Mountin Nam
Ase Nare
mnSquare Nam
SOURCES:
1- IKONOS abtl 1tmtgey,
OneaMelar Resolution (2000 - 2002)
2- Data Collection a d Ground
Tmn Doe In Collaboeon with
AGCHD, Kbul Munepslly and
AIMS (Novembe. 2004)
s. Municipdty Strit souries.,
were Derved fromISAF, Map Tited
"Kabul Munidpaliies and Poloe
DlsS~t, Deled 12 Jaury., 2005.
MP Protecton: GeographicGoode Dalum: WGs 184
For Further Inforrmadan Contact
AIMS at ifoe amsorg.a
Eldronic Copy Vit wwahm.org.sf
r 'Izs
i*Vz
107
-- -
Al
A,
